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Abstract
Most of the literature on skill-biased technological change views both skilled
and unskilled labour as variable inputs. In contrast, this study focuses
on the role of skilled workers comprising overhead labour in the recent
increase in skill demand. The ﬁrst chapter focuses on the aggregate shift in
skill demand, while succeeding chapters focus on the heterogeneity of this
demand across ﬁrms.
In the ﬁrst chapter, I argue that the transition from Ford-style mass
production toward mass customization in the 1980s may be responsible
for the increase in skill demand since introducing new goods requires ﬁxed
labour input, which is biased towards skilled workers. I present a dynamic
general equilibrium model, which explains both the rapid growth in skill
demand since the 1980s and the recent puzzling slowdown since the late
1990s. However, as the ratio of ﬁxed to variable inputs cannot increase
indeﬁnitely, my model also predicts that the growth in skill demand will
slow down in the long run.
In the second chapter, using UK manufacturing data, I show that the
employment share of non-production workers is positively correlated with
ﬁrm size but negatively correlated with the latter over time. I argue that
this serves as evidence for the existence of (partially) ﬁxed skilled labour,
with the premise being that ﬁrms with larger ﬁxed input are both larger in
size and have a higher share of non-production workers. However, short-run
output expansion only increases variable labour, and therefore it decreases
the employment share of non-production workers.
In the third chapter, I present a second piece of evidence in support
of the main thesis of this dissertation. I show that exiting ﬁrms as well
as entering ﬁrms have a higher share of non-production workers in UK
manufacturing industries. This phenomenon is rather puzzling as exiting
ﬁrms have lower labour productivity, but nevertheless the ﬁnding presents
itself as being consistent with the contention of this study that skilled
workers constitute an overhead labour input.
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Chapter 1
The role of product
diversiﬁcation in skill-biased
technological change
1.1 Introduction
The wage gap between the white-collar and the blue-collar workers has
risen signiﬁcantly in the US since the 1980s. 1 The majority of the lit-
erature (e.g., Autor et al. [1998]; Katz and Murphy [1992]; Autor et al.
[2008]) attributes this shift to technological change, indicating that recent
technological developments such as the rise of information technology tend
to favour skilled workers, a hypothesis referred to as the skill-biased tech-
nological change (SBTC) hypothesis.2
The question arises as to how technological changes aﬀect the skill de-
1The UK also experienced a sharp rise in the wage diﬀerential during this period.
Although this trend has been noted to be less strong in countries such as Germany and
Sweden [Machin and van Reenen, 1998], the shift in labour demand towards white-collar
workers has been identiﬁed as common in many industrialized countries.
2Autor et al. [1998], for example, found that the share of college-graduate workers
had risen faster in more computer-intensive industries.
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mand. The most common interpretation, described by Acemoglu and Autor
[2010] as the canonical model of skill-biased technological change, is that
a certain type of technological innovation enables white-collar workers to
produce goods more eﬃciently than blue collar workers. As a result, the
demand for white-collar workers as well as their wages increase relative to
those of blue-collar workers. It focuses on process innovation by assuming
single representative output good production function, but largely ignor-
ing the role of product innovation. It assumes that the rising wage gap is
the result of the rising productivity gap between workers, and that both
white-collar and blue-collar workers constitute variable input.
However, the assumption that white-collar labour is entirely variable in-
put is questionable, considering that most white-collar workers are working
either in the oﬃce or in the laboratory rather than working in the factory
with blue-collar workers, and that their tasks are rather loosely related with
the production quantity. Literature suggests that non-production workers
are more likely to be overhead labour or quasi-ﬁxed rather than variable
input ( Dunne et al. [1996]; Nekarda and Ramey [2013]; Gujarati and Dars
[1972]; Hamermesh [1993]). Therefore, in line with the above, this study
will assume that white-collar workers are overhead labour, and that the
shift in the skill demand occurs not because white-collar workers are re-
placing blue-collar workers in the production process, but because the non-
production tasks, usually implemented in the oﬃce or in the laboratory,
increases more than the production tasks implemented in the factory.
Although a signiﬁcant portion of literature suggests the existence of
overhead labour, the determinants of the demand for the overhead labour
are not clear, yet. This study focuses on the role of product diversiﬁcation,
and presents a dynamic general equilibrium model where the demand for
2
overhead labour, which is biased toward white-collar workers, increases with
product variety. For example, to develop a new mobile phone, many white-
collar workers including engineers, designers, marketing experts, project
managers and other administrative support staﬀ members are needed ir-
respective of production volume. Therefore, this study presents a general
equilibrium model wherein the demand for white-collar workers increases
with the product variety.
Although white-collar workers are assumed to be a ﬁxed input, this
does not mean that aggregate labour demand for them is independent of
the GDP and their wage. White-collar employment is assumed to be ﬁxed
per each product, but equilibrium product variety increases with GDP in
the long-run, increasing the demand for white-collar workers.3 Similarly, if
the wage for white-collar workers decreases, the equilibrium product variety
in the economy increases due to the fall in the ﬁxed labour cost of producing
a new product, thereby increasing the demand for white-collar workers.4
Therefore, this model also predicts the relative employment of white-collar
workers is negatively related to the relative wage (to the blue-collar workers)
even though white-collar workers do not directly replace blue-collar workers
in the factory.
This model leads to a new interpretation of skill-biased change, which
is distinguishable from the conventional view. During the 1980s in the
US, product variety increased dramatically, which was interpreted as a
3This is in line with Gujarati and Dars (1972), who comment that 'it is assumed that
wages paid to production workers are essentially variable costs of production, whereas
those paid to non-production workers are mostly in the nature of overhead or ﬁxed costs,
at least in the short-run.' My model predicts that a short-run expansion of output, which
does not involve an increase in product variety, does not increase the demand for white-
collar workers, while long-term growth of output, which accompanies the increase in the
product variety, increases the demand for white-collar workers.
4This implies that the elasticity of substitution between white-collar and blue-collar
workers increases with the degree of aggregation.
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transition from Ford style standardised production towards more diversiﬁed
production, the so called "Flexible Manufacturing System" (Milgrom and
Roberts [1990]; Mansﬁeld [1993]). This study suggests that such a change
could have increased relative demand for white-collar workers. As the main
driver of the change was supposed to be the dramatic fall in the ﬁxed capital
cost of producing new products due to the IT revolution ([Milgrom and
Roberts, 1990] argue that the rapid fall in the price of computer capital
was the main driver of massive product diversiﬁcation in the 1980s), this
study also supports the view that the IT revolution played an important
role in skill-biased technological change.
This thesis presents predictions, which diﬀer from the standard skill-
biased technological change models. Firstly, the employment share of
white-collar workers is not necessarily positively related to the aggregate
labour productivity. Therefore, it could help to explain the puzzling fact
that the period with strong skill-biased technological change does not al-
ways accompany higher aggregate productivity growth. Secondly, skill-
biased technological change always interacts with the market-structure.
The source of the wage expenditure to the ﬁxed labour come from gross-
proﬁt5 of the ﬁrms. Therefore, if the market is in perfect competition,
there is no room for the employment of white-collar workers. The size of
the mark-up imposes upper bound of the share of ﬁxed labour in the total
labour force, and the mark-up depends on numerous non-technological fac-
tors as well. Thirdly, the rise in skill demand driven by the IT revolution
is predicted to slow down in the long-run. Given the mark-up, the fall
in the ﬁxed capital cost, driven by the IT revolution, allows more of the
ﬁrm's gross proﬁt to be diverted towards the wage expenditure on ﬁxed
5The proﬁt before paying for ﬁxed costs
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labour (white-collar workers). However, such a shift is supposed to slow
down as the share of the ﬁxed capital cost (in the total ﬁxed cost including
both the labour part and the capital part) approaches zero. Unless the
size of the price-cost mark-up increases endlessly, which is quite unlikely,
the wage-bill share of white-collar workers cannot increase indeﬁnitely, al-
though the fall in the ﬁxed capital cost continues indeﬁnitely due to the
continuing progress in IT technology. This is consistent with the empirical
ﬁndings that skill-biased change has begun to slow down recently (Autor
et al. [2008]; Beaudry et al. [2013]).
This study is not the ﬁrst to inquire into the eﬀect of product innovation
on skill-biased change. For example, Xiang [2005], Thoenig and Verdier
[2003] and Sanders [2002] have also argued that new goods increase the
demand for skilled labour because their production processes are more skill-
intensive. They all assume that white-collar workers constitute a variable
input as in the conventional SBTC literature. In contrast, in this study, an
increase in product variety increases the demand for white-collar workers
irrespective of whether the production processes of the new goods are more
skill-intensive or not.
The remainder of the chapter is structured in the following way: Sec-
tion 1.2 illustrates recent labour market trends. Section 1.3 explains the
role of product innovation in skill-biased technological change. Section 1.4
presents the model and the simulation results. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 The trend in the wage-inequality
The trend in the wage gap between college and non-college educated work-
ers in the US is shown in Figure 1.1. The wage gap increased slowly until
5
the early 1970s, and then it began to close in before increasing again dra-
matically in the 1980s and continuing a slower, but still positive, growth
throughout the 1990-2000s. The dramatic shift in the 1980s drew much at-
tention, and there was contention in a signiﬁcant portion of the literature
that the adoption of PCs in the 1980s was responsible for it.
Figure 1.1: College/High school graduates wage ratio, 1963-2008
Source: Acemoglu and Autor [2010]
Although the pattern was not identical, such a shift did not remain
conﬁned to the US. Machin and van Reenen [1998] studied the US, the
UK, Germany, Japan, France, Denmark, and Sweden and found that both
the employment share and the wage-bill share of non-production workers
rose in all of these countries, while the wage gap remained stable, with the
exception of the US and the UK. The fact that the employment share rose
in all the investigated countries implies that the shift in labour demand
towards white-collar workers existed for all of these countries, although the
wage gap did not increase for most of them.6
6The wage diﬀerential between non-production workers and production workers in
Sweden declined slightly from 1.549 in 1977 to 1.509 in 1989, but the employment share
of non-production workers rose from 0.288 to 0.303.
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SBTC and the Productivity Puzzle
A majority of literature on SBTC has utilized the simple two factor CES
function to formulate the skill biased technological change hypothesis. It
is assumed that there are two types of labour input: skilled labour and
unskilled labour. The functional form is as below:7
Qt = [αt (atNs,t)
ρ + (1− αt) (btNu,t)ρ]
1
ρ , 0 < ρ < 1 (1.1)
Here, Qt is the output at time t, Ns,t is the labour input of skilled
workers at t, which is usually deﬁned as the number of college graduate
workers or white-collar workers. Ns,t is the labour input of unskilled work-
ers, deﬁned as the number of workers with lower education or blue-collar
workers. at is the skilled labour-augmenting technology, and bt is the un-
skilled labour-augmenting technology. αt can be interpreted as the share
of production activities assigned to skilled labour. Capital is either non-
existent or separable from the composite labour input.
Figure 1.2: Aggregate labour productivity
Source: Card and DiNardo [2002], Labour productivity per hour, non-farm
business sector
7Acemoglu and Autor [2010] referred to it as the 'canonical' model
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Skill-biased technological change is represented either by an increase in
at relative to bt or by an increase in αt. Therefore, skill-biased technologi-
cal change is supposed to increase aggregate productivity unless the decline
in blue-collar labour augmenting technology is large enough to oﬀset the
rise in white-collar labour augmenting technology. However, according to
Card and DiNardo (2002), the puzzling fact is that the aggregate labour
productivity was stagnant during the 1980s in the US, a period when the
shift in labour demand was most dramatic. This can be seen in Figure 1.2,
which shows that between 1979 and 1986 the growth in labour productivity
slowed down, and its level was below the long-term trend. One possible
explanation is that the productivity growth of blue-collar workers slowed
down during 1980s and oﬀset the productivity growth of white-collar work-
ers. But, it is not certain what caused the slowdown of the productivity
growth of blue-collar workers.
Moreover, the labour productivity growth began to accelerate in the
1990s, but the growth of wage diﬀerential by skill slowed down at the same
time. Therefore, this thesis tries to focus on another channel of skill-biased
technological change, which increases the wage premium of white-collar
workers without necessarily increasing the aggregate labour productivity.
1.3 The role of product variety
Most existing literature on skill-biased technological change has largely
focused on process innovation, while largely ignoring the role of product
innovation on SBTC. They assume a single representative good and argue
that technological innovations, such as the adoption of the PC, ampliﬁed
the productivity of the college graduate workers relative to the productivity
8
of the blue-collar workers. There is no place for product innovation in the
theoretical framework. However, product innovation accounts for a very
signiﬁcant part of R&D activities. For example, according to Petrin and
Warzynski [2012], 74% of the total R&D expenditure is spent on product
innovation in Denmark. Similarly, Lin and Saggi [2002] also note that
'approximately three-fourths of R&D investments by ﬁrms in the United
States are devoted to product R&D'.
Empirically measuring product variety is very diﬃcult. However, there
have been some attempts, and it is known that product variety has dramat-
ically increased since the 1970s. According to Cox and Alm [1998], between
the early 1970s and the late 1990s, the number of vehicle models available
rose from 140 to 260, soft drinks from 20 to over 87, over-the-counter pain
relievers from 17 to 141, running shoes from 5 to 285 and PCs from 0 to
400. Figure 1.3 shows how the number of vehicle models evolved over time
in the US since 1980.
Figure 1.3: The number of vehicle models 1980-97
source: "America's Move to Mass customization", Cox and Alm [1998]
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Greenwood and Uysal [2005] utilised the trademark registration statis-
tics as a proxy for product variety. Figure 1.4 shows the trend of trademark
registration in the US between 1950 and 2008. It was noted that the num-
ber of trademark registrations rose steadily since the 1980s, a trend which
coincided with the rising wage inequality of the 1980s.8 Moreover, the
number of ﬁrms per capita also increased accordingly for the same period
(Greenwood and Uysal [2005]) as illustrated in Figure 1.5.
Figure 1.4: The trademark registration
Source: WIPO, "World Intellectual Property Indicators"
There is literature, which has investigated the role of product inno-
vation in SBTC. Xiang [2005] has argued that the introduction of new
goods favours skilled labour because new goods are produced with more
skill-biased technology than existing goods. This study shows that the
average skill intensity of new goods was more than 40% higher than the
old goods in the US manufacturing industries between the late 1970s and
the 1980s. Thoenig and Verdier [2003] have argued that the competitive
8Xiang [2005] attributes the surge in inequality in the 1980s to the availability of new
products, 'such as ﬁber optic cables, Windows series software, VCRs and soft contact
lens.'
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Figure 1.5: The number of ﬁrms per capita in the US
Source: Greenwood and Uysal [2005]
pressure from southern low-wage countries has induced northern countries
to adopt skilled-labour intensive technologies because they are harder for
southern countries to imitate. It is assumed that the production process of
new goods is more skill intensive than that of old goods, which southern
countries can also produce. Northern ﬁrms are forced to adopt the new
technology to avoid competing with southern countries. Sanders [2002]
has argued that the development of new goods is skill-biased because pro-
duction of new goods requires more skilled labour, who can ﬂexibly deal
with uncertainty of production, which is higher in the early stage of prod-
uct life cycle. However, this literature commonly assumes that introducing
new products increases skill demand because the production process of new
goods is more skill-intensive than old goods.9
Nevertheless, this is not necessarily true for every new good, especially
for horizontal product diﬀerentiation. One recent example is the devel-
opment of the iPhone 4 white colour version by Apple. It is identical to
9This contrasts with Nelson and Phelps [1966] who argue that more educated workers
are needed to adopt the latest vintage of production technology more quickly.
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the black colour version except for the colour, and there is no technolog-
ical improvement from the black colour version.10 This thesis will focus
on the eﬀect of horizontal product diﬀerentiation, in which case the new
goods are not necessarily technologically more sophisticated, and therefore
do not necessarily require more skilled workers in the production process.
The diﬀerence in this study is that the introduction of any new goods
increases the relative demand for white-collar workers, regardless of the
level of technological sophistication.
The share of ﬁxed labour cost
Firms can pay for ﬁxed inputs only if their gross proﬁt (proﬁt before paying
ﬁxed costs) is positive. This means that ﬁrms can pay for ﬁxed inputs,
which includes both a ﬁxed labour and a ﬁxed capital, only if the price is
greater than the marginal cost. This implies that the mark-up ratio must
be greater than 1. Under the assumption of free-entry, ﬁrms will earn zero
net proﬁt (proﬁt after paying ﬁxed costs) although their gross proﬁt would
be still positive:
pi = (p · q −WBv − r · kv)− (WBf + r · kf ) = 0 (1.2)
Here, WBf is the total wage bill for ﬁxed labour, and WBv is the total
wage bill for variable labour. The former is supposed to be biased towards
white-collar workers while the latter is supposed to be biased towards blue-
collar workers. r·kf is the total expenditure on ﬁxed capital, and r·kv is the
total expenditure on variable capital. The ﬁrst term of the equation (1.2)
10However, Apple spent a signiﬁcant amount on R& D because making it whiter
involves some technological diﬃculties, such as the UV protection issue to simply to
make it white.
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represents the gross proﬁt. The ratio of total ﬁxed cost to total variable
cost in the zero-proﬁt equilibrium is :
WBf + r · kf
WBv + r · kv = µ (1.3)
Under the assumption of constant marginal cost and free entry and exit,
the LHS, which is the ratio of the ﬁxed to the variable cost, must be the
same as µ = P−MC
MC
.11 Under the assumption that white-collar labour is an
entirely ﬁxed input and blue-collar labour is an entirely variable input, the
equation (1.3) is equivalent of:
WBw + r · ŝf · k
WBv + r · (1− ŝf ) · k = µ̂ (1.4)
Here, WBw is the total wage bill for white-collar labour, and WBb is
the total wage bill for blue-collar labour. ŝf is the share of ﬁxed capital in
the total capital stock, k. The values of µ̂ have been constructed using US
manufacturing data over 1970-1992 and compared with µ.
The data on the wage bill for both production workers and non-production
workers and capital stock comes from the NBER-CES Manufacturing In-
dustry Database, which is based on the ASM (American Survey of Man-
ufacturers). The interest rate used here is the Baa rated corporate bond
rate, which comes from the FRB (Federal Reserve Board). The inﬂation
rate is from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
The data on the mark-up is from Oliveira Martins et al. [1996]. In that
study, the mark-up ratios for 36 manufacturing industries in the US are
estimated over 1970-1992 utilizing the method of Roeger [1995], assuming
that the mark-up ratio is constant over the period. However, not all indus-
11While mark-up is the ratio between the price and the cost, µ is the ratio between
variable proﬁt and marginal cost. µ = mark-up−1
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Figure 1.6: Mark-up vs Implied Mark-up
try groups in Oliveira Martins et al. [1996] showed signiﬁcant estimates for
the mark-up ratio, and only the estimates for 26 industry groups amongst
them are used in this study. The list of mark-up ratios for each industry
and the method of estimation are shown in the Appendix. The rental rate
of capital, r, is derived following Oliveira Martins et al. [1996]:
r = ((i− pi) + δ) · pk (1.5)
Here, i is the nominal interest rate, which is given by the Baa rated
corporate bond rate (by Moodies). pi is the inﬂation rate, and δ is the
depreciation rate, which is set to 5% per year. pk is the price index of the
investment good.
One problem is that the share of ﬁxed capital in the total capital stock
is unobservable. To deal with this, the share of plant and buildings in the
total capital stock is used as a proxy for the share of ﬁxed capital. The
rationale is that buildings are usually adjusted more rigidly than equipment
14
or vehicles. For example, at least one head-quarter building and one factory
are needed to establish a ﬁrm. Then, it is possible to increase equipment
without building another factory (upto a certain level). However, this is a
crude measure as some part of equipment or vehicles might be ﬁxed capital
as well.12
The comparison of µ and µ̂ is shown in Figure 1.6. There is a positive
correlation between them. Those industries with a higher share of ﬁxed
costs, such as Oﬃce & Computing, Drug & Medicine and Radio, TV &
Communications, are also shown to have a higher mark-up ratio. Those
with a lower share of ﬁxed cost, such as Food Products and Petrol Reﬁner-
ies, are shown to have a lower mark-up ratio.
However, many industries, especially tobacco industries, show much
higher mark-up ratio than is implied from the ratio of ﬁxed cost to variable
cost. This may suggest the existence of excess proﬁt due to market power.
Moreover, although it is assumed that the share of ﬁxed capital equals the
share of building and plant capital, part of equipment or vehicles may be
ﬁxed input as well, which causes downward bias in the estimated share of
ﬁxed capital, ŝf and the implied mark-up, µ̂. If the assumption of constant
marginal cost is violated and the actual marginal cost is decreasing in scale,
it also lowers the ratio of ﬁxed cost to variable cost relative to the mark-up
ratio in the zero-proﬁt equilibrium.
It is also possible to derive the implied wage-bill share of white-collars
(relative to the total wage-bill including both white-collar and blue-collar
workers) from the equation (1.3) and (1.4). Then, the actual wage-bill
share of white-collar workers is compared with the implied wage-bill share
12As we discuss long-run equilibrium, the term "ﬁxed capital" means the capital which
does not adjust as the output level varies in the long run as well as in the short run.
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of ﬁxed labour in Figure 1.7. These two must be the same by construction
if µ̂ is the same as µ.
Figure 1.7: Observed wage-bill share vs implied share
For the same reasons as the implied ratios of ﬁxed cost to variable cost
(supposed to be the same as µ) are lower than µ, the observed wage-bill
shares of white-collar workers are lower than the implied wage-bill share
of ﬁxed labour. The fact that the implied wage-bill share exceeds 100%
for some industries, which is impossible in reality, implies that some of the
implied wage-bill shares of ﬁxed labour are clearly overestimated. How-
ever, the observed wage-bill shares of white-collar workers are shown to be
positively correlated with the implied wage-bill shares of ﬁxed labour. Al-
though this is not a very robust result, it is consistent with the hypothesis
that white-collar labour should be considered overhead labour.
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1.4 Model
In this model, people value the variety of consumption as well as the quan-
tity of consumption. People are even willing to substitute some consump-
tion quantity for more variety of consumption. 13 To accommodate such a
'love of variety' property, this model utilizes Dixit and Stiglitz [1977] style
monopolistic competition framework.
Most Dixit-Stiglitz style monopolistic competition models usually as-
sume the existence of ﬁxed costs, which comprise either a output good or
a labour input. The modiﬁcations made in this model are : ﬁrstly, the
ﬁxed cost includes not only ﬁxed labour cost but also ﬁxed capital cost
to incorporate the role of the decline in ﬁxed capital cost (possibly due
to IT technology), and secondly, the ﬁxed labour input is biased toward
white-collar workers (non-production workers). 14 It will be shown later
in this chapter that these two seemingly minor modiﬁcations jointly gener-
ate results, which are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from conventional skill-biased
technological change models.
1.4.1 Utility
Consumer utility is increasing with the consumption level of composite
good x:
U = u(x) (1.6)
u′ > 0, u′′ < 0
13In Krugman [1979b], the motivation of technological innovation is not producing the
same goods more eﬃciently but producing new goods to gain more monopoly power.
14In this study, I assume that the term 'white-collar workers' is a synonym for the
'non-production workers', and that they have a higher educational level than production
workers, while the term 'blue-collar workers' is synonymous with 'production workers'.
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The composite good, x, is deﬁned by a CES function as below:
x =
(ˆ N
0
q(i)ρdi
) 1
ρ
0 < ρ < 1
Here, i ∈ [0, N ] is the index of the product variety, where N represents
the maximum level of variety available in the economy (N ∈ R++). The
constant ρ represents the substitutability between diﬀerent goods. The
lower the ρ is, the lower the substitutability is. The elasticity of substitution
is 1
1−ρ . It is assumed that every consumer has an identical preference and
the elasticity of substitution is also identical for every product i.
1.4.2 Firm's problem
Each product variety is produced with the identical technology following a
Cobb-Douglas functional form, but production can begin only if the ﬁrm
employs both ﬁxed labour and ﬁxed capital above minimum required levels
(l¯, k¯):
qi = A · (lbi )α · (kvi )1−α if lwi ≥ l¯ & kfi ≥ k¯
Here, qi is the production volume of product variety i, and l
b
i is the
blue-collar labour input for producing a product i. As it is assumed that
only blue-collar workers constitute variable labour input, their employ-
ment is equivalent to the variable labour input. kvi is the variable part of
the capital input for good i. The parameter A represents the exogenous
level of skill-neutral production technology, which augments all factor in-
puts proportionately.15 It is assumed that the production technology, A, is
15TFP is deﬁned as the change in output which is not caused by the change in input.
However, A diﬀers from typically measured TFP in that it accounts only for the change
in variable input excluding ﬁxed input, while typical TFP accounts for both ﬁxed and
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exogenous and independent from the employment of white-collar workers.
There is no economy of scope, so every ﬁrm produces only one product.
Therefore, the number of product varieties is the same as the number of
ﬁrms. As most ﬁrms are multi-product ﬁrms in reality, the ﬁrm in this
model should be understood as one of the many divisions within a ﬁrm
rather than as a ﬁrm in the form of a legal entity.16 Moreover, even the same
type of product of the same ﬁrm sold in diﬀerent markets (country, region
or targeting consumer's demographic group, etc.) should be interpreted as
diﬀerent products produced by diﬀerent ﬁrms in this model.
Nekarda and Ramey [2013] suggest that the upper bound of the share
of the overhead labour is the share of non-production workers, and this is
because the elasticity of the employment of non-production workers with
respect to the output is signiﬁcantly less than that of production workers
but still greater than zero.17
However, the fact that the employment of white-collar workers still
ﬂuctuates with the output does not contradict the assumption that the
number of white-collar workers per each product variety is ﬁxed. The
employment of ﬁxed labour comprised of white-collar workers for a multi-
product ﬁrm is expected to increase with the expansion of the product range
of the ﬁrm, which is very likely to be positively correlated with the output
as ﬁrms need to expand to wider range of markets to sell more quantities
of goods. According to Hottman et al. [2014], 'variation in ﬁrm quality and
variable input.
16The Dixit-Stiglitz style monopolistic competition model, which implies single prod-
uct ﬁrm, is adopted for simplicity although in reality most ﬁrms are multi-product ﬁrms.
Within this framework, however, multi-product ﬁrms can be understood as a group of
diﬀerent divisions, independently producing diﬀerent goods.
17Nekarda and Ramey [2013] ﬁnds that 'the elasticity of the log of employment of
nonproduction workers to GDP is positive and statistically signiﬁcant and is about half
of the elasticity of production workers with respect to GDP'
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product scope explains at least four ﬁfths of the variation in ﬁrm sales.'
Therefore, overhead labour input can be still indirectly correlated with the
output. To sum up, the demand for white-collar labour is ﬁxed only per
each product variety, but not ﬁxed at more aggregated level comprising
multiple products.
Although it is possible that a signiﬁcant portion of white-collar labour
constitutes variable labour rather than overhead labour, it is very hard
to know the share of non-overhead part. Moreover, the fact that the de-
mand for white-collar workers ﬂuctuates with output does not necessarily
reject the hypothesis that the entire white-collar labour is overhead labour.
Therefore, it will be assumed in this model that the entire white-collar
workforce constitutes overhead labour, which is still correlated with out-
put at a more aggregated level.
Firm's proﬁt maximization
Each ﬁrm is small enough not to inﬂuence the factor prices, and ﬁrms
optimize the employment level of both variable and ﬁxed factors given the
factor prices to maximize the proﬁt:
pii =pi · qi − c(qi)− fixed cost
=(pi −mc) · qi − fixed cost
Firm i's proﬁt, pii, is total revenue minus the sum of the variable costs
and the ﬁxed costs. Because every ﬁrm has partial monopolistic power,
ﬁrms set price higher than marginal cost. The lower the substitutability
between goods, the higher is the mark-up. All ﬁrms set the same price,
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given the demand curve derived from the CES utility function of the equa-
tion (1.6) :
p∗i =
mc
ρ
mark−up (= µ+ 1) = p
mc
=
1
ρ
The total variable cost, c(qi), is the sum of total wage bill for blue-collar
workers and the variable capital cost:
c(qi) =mc · qi
=Wb · lbi + r · kvi
Here, mc is the marginal cost, which is constant.18 Wb is the wage for
blue-collar workers, and r is the interest rate. The ﬁxed cost, which consists
of ﬁxed labour input as well as ﬁxed capital input is:
fixed cost = Ww · l¯ + r · k¯
Here, Ww is the wage for white-collar workers, and l¯ is the minimum
required level of ﬁxed labour for each product, which is assumed to be
identical for all ﬁrms. The employment of white-collar labour for ﬁrm i, lwi ,
is equal to l¯. Similarly, the employment of ﬁxed capital equals to k¯ for all
ﬁrms. The interest rate, r, is the same for both variable capital and ﬁxed
capital.
18The marginal cost is constant because the Cobb-Douglas production function ex-
hibits constant returns to scale and the factor prices do not change with the production
level of individual ﬁrms.
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The employment of blue-collar labour is determined so that the value
of marginal revenue product of labour (MRPL) equals the wage. Here,
MRPL = MR ×MPL. 19 Given the above CES-preferences shown in
equation (1.6), MR = p · ρ. As the price of the output, p, is normalized to
1 and MR = ρ. The demand for blue-collar labour for a ﬁrm i is:
lb,i =
{
A · α · k1−αv,i ·
ρ
Wb
} 1
1−α
The same applies to the variable capital input:
kv,i =
{
A · (1− α) · lαb,i ·
ρ
r
} 1
α
Due to the symmetry condition, every ﬁrm's optimal level of employ-
ment is identical: lb = lb,i and kv,i = kv,i for all ﬁrms i.
Zero-Proﬁt condition
Free entry is assumed. If ﬁrms earn positive proﬁt, new ﬁrms will enter the
market, and production quantity for existing ﬁrms will decrease as a result
of competition. Therefore, all ﬁrms will make zero proﬁt in equilibrium.
Hence:
pi∗i =(p
∗
i −mc) · q∗i − fixed cost
=mc ·
(
1
ρ
− 1
)
· qi − fixed cost = 0
19In a monopolistic competition market,MR < P , unlike a perfect competitive market
where MR = P .
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Ww · l¯ + r · k¯ (= fixed cost)
mc · q (= total variable cost) = µ =
1
ρ
− 1 (1.7)
Equation (1.7) shows that ratio between the total ﬁxed cost and the
total variable cost is determined by the mark-up ratio. Under symmetry,
all ﬁrms will produce the same amount of goods with the same amount of
input in equilibrium. Therefore, qi = q, li = l, ki = k for all i. Recall that
the shift in labour demand towards white-collar workers happens for two
reasons in our model:
1. mark-up↑ : Total expenditure on ﬁxed factors increases relative to
variable factors.
2. ﬁxed capital cost↓ : Given a total expenditure for ﬁxed factors, ﬁxed
labour cost (the employment of white-collar workers) will constitute
a higher share.
The mark-up ratio is unlikely to have risen continuously. However, the
ﬁxed capital cost is likely to have declined relative to the ﬁxed labour cost
for two reasons. The total ﬁxed capital cost per variety is r · k¯, where that
of labour is Ww · l¯. If both the exogenous parameters, k¯ and l¯, remain
constant, the fact that the growth rate of wage is usually higher than that
of the interest rate decreases ﬁxed capital cost relative to ﬁxed labour
cost. Moreover, the adoption of FMS (Flexible Manufacturing Systems)
could have lowered the minimum ﬁxed capital requirement to introduce
new variety, k¯.
The level of ﬁxed capital stock is unobservable, but the capital stock of
plant and buildings can be used as a rough proxy for the ﬁxed capital as
in the section 1.3. The trend in the share of the plant and buildings in the
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Figure 1.8: The share of plant and building in the total capital stock in US
manufacturing industries in 1970-92
source: NBER-CES manufacturing Industry databse.
total capital stock in the US manufacturing industries between the years
1970 to 1992 is shown in the Figure 1.8.
Endogenous skill supply
Both the supply and demand for the white-collar labour is endogenously
determined in the model. The supply of white-collar labour is determined
as a result of optimization decisions of young workers who compare the
wage premium for white-collar workers and the education cost required
to become white-collar workers. The demand for white-collar labour is
increasing with the number of products, N . However, N is decreasing
with the wage premium as lower wage premium of white-collar workers
encourages further product diversiﬁcation by lowering the ﬁxed cost of
introducing new products. As a result, the demand for white-collar labour
is decreasing with the wage premium. The wage premium is determined so
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that it equalizes the supply and demand for white-collar labour:
LSw
(
Ww
Wb
)
= LDw (N) = L
D
w
(
N
(
Ww
Wb
))
In accordance with Caselli [1999], the learning cost, σe,i, is assumed to
be heterogeneous between workers and only those workers whose learning
cost is lower than the wage premium from the education will join educa-
tion. Those with a lower learning cost will decide to go to the university
and become white-collar workers, but those with a higher learning cost will
be blue-collar workers. Following Caselli [1999], it is assumed, for sim-
plicity, that each individual's subjective learning cost, σe,i, follows uniform
distribution so that σe,i ∈ [0, σ¯e].20 σ¯e is a exogenous parameter, which
represents the learning cost of the worker with the highest learning cost.21
However, the learning cost in monetary value is assumed to increase with
the wage level of unskilled workers as the opportunity cost of education in-
creases with the foregone wage during the period of education. Therefore,
each young worker with the leaning cost, σe,i, chooses to go to university
and become a white-collar worker if Ww − Wb > σe,i · Wb. The average
learning cost of all workers equals to
σ¯e ·Wb
2
.
As the wage premium increases, the threshold level of subjective learn-
ing cost, below which it is optimal to become a white-collar worker, in-
creases accordingly, and the share of workers who choose to become white-
collar workers increases as a result. Therefore, the labour supply of white-
20The learning cost is deﬁned in broader terms, and includes not only tuition fee but
also any opportunity cost of lost labour income, lost leisure, personal eﬀort and other
obstacles to education such as credit constraints.
21Unlike Caselli [1999], where the learning cost is independent of the wage, it is as-
sumed that the learning cost is proportional to the wage level of blue-collar workers,
as it is likely that the opportunity cost of education increases with the wage level of
unskilled labour.
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collar workers (relative to total labour force) increases with the wage pre-
mium (but decreases with σ¯e):
LSw =
Ww −Wb
σ¯e ·Wb L
LDw = N · l¯
The wage of white-collar workers is determined so that it equates the
demand, LDw and the supply, L
S
w, of white-collar labour:
∴ Ww = Wb ·
(
1 + σ¯e
Lw
L
)
= Wb ·
(
1 + σ¯e
N · l¯
L
)
An increase in N increases the wage for white-collar labour relative to
blue-collar workers by increasing the demand for the white-collar labour.
However, an increase in σ¯e, which represents higher average education cost,
increases the wage for white-collar workers relative to blue-collar by lower-
ing the supply of white-collar labour.
1.4.3 Market clearing conditions
Factor markets are cleared, if the sum of the demand of individual ﬁrms
for each factor input equals the supply (or endowment) of the factor inputs
in the whole economy. The total workforce, L, is assumed to be given
exogenously but is allocated endogenously between white-collar labour and
blue-collar labour:
Lb = N · lb = N ·
{
A · α · k1−αv ·
ρ
Wb
} 1
1−α
Lw = N · lw = N · l¯
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Lb + Lw = L
Lb is the total employment of blue-collar workers in the economy, and
Lw is the total employment of white-collar workers. Similarly for capital:
Kv = N · kv = N ·
{
A · (1− α) · lαb ·
ρ
r
} 1
α
Kf = N · kf = N · k¯
Kv +Kf = K
The total capital stock in the economy, K, is exogenously given at
each point in time, but endogenously allocated between variable part, Kv
and ﬁxed part, Kf . However, I will show how capital stock accumulates
endogenously over time in section 1.4.5.
1.4.4 Static equilibrium
In this model, both the number of product varieties and the relative de-
mand for white-collar workers are endogenously determined given the total
endowment of factors (labour and capital) and exogenous parameters on
the technology and the consumer taste. First, the equilibrium number of
product varieties, N , is determined from the zero proﬁt condition, and then
all other variables such as the relative employment share of white-collar
workers and their wage premium over blue-collar workers are determined
accordingly.
In this section, the level of total capital stock is supposed to be ex-
ogenously given, and ﬁrms and consumers optimize given the level of to-
tal capital stock, total labour endowment and the exogenous parameters.
However, later in this chapter, it will be shown how the level of total cap-
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ital stock endogenously evolves over time through dynamic optimization
behaviours of agents.
Deﬁnition. 1. A competitive equilibrium (static) is a set of consumptions
and prices of each product, (c(i) and p(i)), variable and ﬁxed factor inputs,
(Lw, Lb, Kv and Kf), the number of ﬁrms (products), N , wages, (Ww and
Wb), interest rate, r, for a set of exogenous parameters, (α, A, L, ρ, σ¯e, l¯
and k¯), given the factor endowment, L and K, which satisfy:
1. Each consumer optimally chooses consumption allocation, c(i), for
each product i, given prices p(i).
2. Each worker optimally chooses whether to become a white-collar worker
or a blue-collar worker given the wage levels, (Ww and Wb,).
3. Factor allocation, (Lw, Lb, Kv and Kf), solves the ﬁrm's problem
given the prices of goods and factors.
4. All ﬁrms run zero-proﬁt and the number of ﬁrms (product variety),
N , is consistent with the zero-proﬁt.
5. All goods and factor markets clear.
To solve the competitive equilibrium solutions, the number of products,
N , will be derived given the level of endowments, L and K, from the
zero-proﬁt condition. Then, other endogenous variables will be determined
accordingly.
The number of product varieties in the economy
Substituting the above market clearing conditions into the zero-proﬁt con-
dition of the equation (1.7) yields an equation as below:
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pi = ρ · A · L
α
b ·K1−αv
N
(
1
ρ
− 1
)
− (Ww · l¯ + r · k¯) = 0 (1.8)
Here, α, A, ρ, l¯ and k¯ are exogenous parameters, while N , Lb, Kv,
Ww and r are endogenous variables. Both Lt and Kt are assumed to be
exogenously given at the time t, but it will be shown, later in this chapter,
how the capital stock evolves endogenously over time. Substituting the
above market clearing conditions into the equation (1.8 leaves only one
endogenous variable, N , and it can be solved for N . As proﬁt of a ﬁrm
is monotonically decreasing in N , there must be a unique solution for N
according to the intermediate value theorem. By solving the equation (1.8)
for N , the equilibrium product variety is endogenously determined. Then,
the equilibrium levels of other endogenous variables are derived accordingly.
The examples of the competitive equilibrium solutions will be illustrated
in the following sections.
Evolution of product variety in K
Capital accumulation lowers the rental rate of capital relative to wage,
ceteris paribus. The total ﬁxed capital cost, r·k¯, falls not only relative to the
ﬁxed labour cost, Ww · l¯, but also relative to the variable labour cost, Wb · lb,
and the variable capital cost, r ·kv.22 As the total ﬁxed cost falls relative to
the variable cost, total ﬁxed cost falls below the gross proﬁt, which is the
multiplication of the mark-up and the total variable cost; hence, the net
proﬁt becomes positive. Seeking positive proﬁt, more ﬁrms enter into the
market, thereby increasing the number of product varieties. The ﬁrm entry
continues until the net proﬁt decreases to zero as the increased competition
22Both the output and the variable capital stock per product increase with capital
accumulation while the ﬁxed capital stock does not.
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drives down the proﬁt. Therefore, the number of products, N , is positively
related with the total capital stock, K, ceteris paribus. As the product
variety increases with the capital stock, the relative demand for white-
collar labour, which is positively related with N , increases accordingly.
The relationship is illustrated in the Figure 1.9.23
Figure 1.9: Evolution of product variety and skill demand in K
At the top right quadrant, it is shown how the share of ﬁxed capital cost
in the total ﬁxed cost,
r · k¯
Ww · l¯ + r · k¯ , declines as the capital stock increases.
As the total capital stock, K, increases from K1 to K2, the share of the
23The parameters assumed to derive the competitive equilibrium solution are: L is
normalized to 1, and it is assumed that there is no population growth. The CES utility
function is set so that ρ = 0.7, which implies that the elasticity of substitution between
goods eqauls to aproximately 3.33 and the mark-up ratio equals to approximately 1.43.
l¯ is 0.01, which means that the ﬁxed labour input per product is 1% of the total labour
endowment of the economy. k¯ = 0.05, which implies that the ﬁxed capital input per
product is 5% of the total capital endowment when K = 1. σe = 2, which means that
the upper bound of the personal learning cost is twice the blue-collar wage, and the wage
of white-collar workers must be twice the blue-collar workers to induce 50% of workers
to choose university education and become white-collar workers.
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ﬁxed capital cost decreases from k1f to k
2
f . As a result, the corresponding
level of product variety, N , increases from N1 to N2. This is shown at the
bottom right quadrant.
The curve at the bottom right quadrant represents the zero-proﬁt equi-
librium level of product varieties corresponding to the level of total capital
stock, K. If the number of products is above the equilibrium level, the
net-proﬁt is negative, and ﬁrms begin to exit, decreasing the number of
products towards the equilibrium level. If the number of products is below
the equilibrium level, the net-proﬁt is above zero, and N increases with the
entrance of new ﬁrms seeking positive proﬁt.
In the bottom left quadrant, the corresponding motion of the employ-
ment share of white-collar workers,
Lw
L
, with respect to the product va-
riety, N , is shown. The employment of white-collar workers, Lw, linearly
increases with the number of product varieties, N , and is represented as
the straight line from the origin. As the number of products increases from
N1 to N2, the corresponding employment share of white-collar workers
increases from l1 to l2.
In the top left quadrant, the corresponding motion of the wage premium
of white-collar workers with respect to the employment share of white-collar
workers is shown. The wage premium of white-collar workers over blue-
collar workers, W
w
W b
, is an increasing function of the employment share of
white-collar workers, L
w
L
. It is due to that higher wage premium is needed to
induce more people to invest in education and become white-collar workers.
As the employment share of white-collar workers increases from l1 to l2,
the corresponding level of the wage premium increases from w1 to w2.
However, the growth rate of N decreases as K increases, and N con-
verges towards Nmax as K goes towards inﬁnity. It is because capital
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accumulation lowers only the capital part of the ﬁxed cost without lower-
ing the labour part of the ﬁxed cost. Nmax corresponds to the equilibrium
number of products when the share of ﬁxed capital cost converges toward
zero. As the product variety is upper bounded, both the employment share
of white-collar workers and the wage premium are upper bounded as well.
The corresponding upper bound of the employment share of white-collar
workers is lmax and that of the wage premium of white-collar workers is
wmax. This implies that the shift in skill-demand driven by the relative
decline of the ﬁxed capital cost is supposed to slow down in the long-run,
which is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings that skill-biased change has
begun to slow down recently (Autor et al. [2008]; Beaudry et al. [2013]).
Recovering key parameters
From the data, the unobservable exogenous parameters, k¯ and l¯, are re-
covered by the model.24 The mark-up ratio is taken from Christopoulou
and Vermeulen [2008]. The ratio is for whole industries (including service
industries as well as manufacturing) in the US for the period between 1981
to 2004. Data on labour and capital compensation, the number of employ-
ees and the total capital stock are drawn from the EUKLEMS dataset. In
EUKLEMS, workers are categorized into three groups, which include high-
skilled workers with a university education, middle-skilled workers with
high school or equivalent vocational education and low-skilled workers. I
identify the high-skilled workers of the data as the white-collar workers of
the model. The number of products, N , is deﬁned as the 5 year moving-
24k¯ and l¯ are calibrated to replicate the levels of employment and the wages of both
white-collar and blue-collar workers given observed N , L, K, r and mark-up ratio.
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average of the total trademark registration in the US.25 The trend of the
parameters, k¯ and l¯, is then recovered from the data, and shown in Figure
1.10.
Figure 1.10: The trend of implied ﬁxed inputs - k¯ & l¯
The ﬁxed capital input per product, k¯, has fallen continuously since
the early 1980s. This could be due to the introduction of FMS (Flexible
Manufacturing System), which enabled the production of another type of
good by simply changing the software settings of the machinery.26 However,
the ﬁxed labour input per variety, l¯, remained roughly stable until late
1980s but began to fall during 1990s. This might be due to the increasing
replacement of white-collar workers in the workplace by the adoption of IT
technology since the 1990s.
As a result, the share of ﬁxed capital cost has fallen, while the share
of ﬁxed labour cost has risen in the total ﬁxed cost, as is shown in Figure
1.11. The implied share of the ﬁxed capital cost in the total ﬁxed cost has
decreased from 60.9% in 1980 to 36.9% in 1993. The decline in the share of
ﬁxed capital cost increased the implied share of the ﬁxed labour cost from
25One interpretation is that a product survives for 5 years before being replaced by
another.
26According to Mansﬁeld [1993], 'the average year of ﬁrst use of ﬂexible manufacturing
systems by major ﬁrms' is 1977.
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39.1% to 63.1% for the same period.
Figure 1.11: The share of ﬁxed capital and ﬁxed labour costs
However, the increase in the implied share of ﬁxed labour cost began to
slow down since 1993, which is supposed to have slowed down the growth of
wage diﬀerential between white-collar workers and blue-collar workers for
the same period, as is shown in Figure 1.12. It is likely that the increase in
the demand for the ﬁxed labour input, which is biased toward white-collar
workers, will continue to slow down as the share of ﬁxed labour cost, which
is the wage for white-collar workers, in the total ﬁxed cost is approaching
100%.
Nevertheless, it does not necessarily imply that the technology growth
which has caused the increase in skill demand has slowed down. Suppose
the decline in k¯ has been driven by a ﬁxed capital saving technological
change, which is represented by vt:
k¯0 = vt · k¯t
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Here, k¯t is the minimum required level of ﬁxed capital input per product
at t. k¯0 represents the initial level of k¯ at period 0, which is year 1970. As
ﬁxed capital saving technologies such as computerized factories and ﬂexible
manufacturing systems improve, less ﬁxed capital is required to produce
another product variety. Therefore, as the ﬁxed capital saving technology,
vt, improves (possibly due to the IT revolution), the level of k¯t declines
over time relative to k¯0.
Figure 1.12: The trend of ﬁxed capital saving technology ln(v) & ln(Ww
Wb
)
The trend of the log of vt is shown in Figure 1.12. It is shown that
the implied value of the ln(vt) has kept on rising continuously even after
the growth of the wage diﬀerential began to slow down from 1993 onwards.
This is because the increase in vt shifts labour demand towards ﬁxed labour,
biased toward white-collar workers, but at a decreasing rate. If the share
of ﬁxed labour in the given total ﬁxed cost is near 100%, further increase
in vt has little eﬀect on the demand for the ﬁxed labour. Therefore, this
is consistent with a puzzling empirical fact that the rise in wage inequality
began to slow down in the 1990s, although there was no sign of the slow
down in the progress of IT technology.
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1.4.5 Dynamic equilibrium
In above sections, I have shown how the number of products and other
endogenous variables are optimized given the level of factor endowments.
However, in this section, the total capital stock is not given exogenously
but evolves over time endogenously following a law of motion. As the total
labour endowment (population), Lt, is assumed to be constant, Kt is the
only state variable. Once Kt is determined following the law of motion, the
equilibrium levels of other endogenous variables are derived accordingly
given the static equilibrium solutions.
Deﬁnition. 2. A competitive equilibrium (dynamic) is a set of sequences
for consumption and price of each product, {c(i), p(i)}∞t=0, variable and ﬁxed
factor inputs, {Lw, Lb, Kv, Kf}∞t=0, the number of ﬁrms (products), {Nt}∞t=0,
wages, {Ww,Wb}∞t=0, interest rate, {r}∞t=0, for a set of exogenous parame-
ters, (α, A, L, ρ, σ¯e, l¯ and k¯), given the constant population, L and the
initial endowment of the total capital stock, K0, which satisfy:
1. Each consumer optimally choose consumption allocation, c(i), both
across each type of product i, and over time, given prices, p(i), and
discount factor, β.
2. Each worker optimally choose whether to become a white-collar worker
or a blue-collar worker given the wage levels, (Ww and Wb), which are
functions of the total capital stock, Kt.
3. Factor allocation, (Lw, Lb, Kv and Kf), solves ﬁrm's problem given
the prices of goods and factor endowment at each time period, t.
4. All ﬁrms run zero-proﬁt and the number of ﬁrms (product variety),
Nt, is consistent with the zero-proﬁt, at each time period, t.
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5. All goods and factor markets clear, at each time period, t.
Following two-period Overlapping Generations Model framework, it is
assumed that the agents live across two periods. In the ﬁrst period, they
are young and earn labour income,Wt. They divide it into consumption,Ct,
and saving, St. In the second period, they retire and live on the capital
income from the savings accumulated in the previous period.
young : Ct + St = Wt
old : Ct+1 = (1 + rt+1) · St
They maximize the inter-temporal utility of the two periods by selecting
the optimal level of consumption and saving at time t:
max
{Ct}
. U(Ct) + β · U(Ct+1)
U
′
(Ct) = β · (1 + rt+1) · U ′(Ct+1) (1.9)
There are two points of departure from the standard OLG model.
Firstly, there are two types of agents, white-collar and blue-collar workers,
instead of homogeneous representative agents. However, they are diﬀer-
ent only in wage income, and the same type of agents has the same level
of wage. Both types of agents have the same utility function and discount
rate. Secondly, the goods are heterogeneous, and the utility of consumption
increases with product variety given the total consumption expenditure.
It is assumed that the utility function with respect to the CES consump-
tion bundle, x, takes a log form, so that U = u(x) = ln(x). A consumer of
j type (j = white-collar or blue-collar workers) optimizes the consumption
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of each product, c(i), given the total expenditure, Cj =
´ N
0
p(i) · c(i)di.
Under symmetry condition, p(i) = 1 for all i, and c(i) is constant for all i.
The maximized utility given the total consumption expenditure is:
U(x) =ln
({ˆ Nt
0
c(i)ρdi
} 1
ρ
)
=ln
({
Nt ·
(
Cj
Nt
)ρ} 1ρ)
=ln
(
N
( 1
ρ
−1)
t · Cj
)
=ln
(
N
( 1
ρ
−1)
t
)
+ ln
(
Cj
)
∴ U ′(Cjt ) =
1
Cjt
(1.10)
By applying (1.10) into the Euler equation of (1.9), the optimal con-
sumption levels of young workers (of type j) at t are:
Cjt
∗
=
1
1 + β
·W jt
The saving rate,
Sjt
W jt
=
β
1 + β
, is the same for every agent, and inde-
pendent from the interest rate as is common in two-period models with log
utility. One noteworthy feature is that the number of products, Nt, does
not inﬂuence the optimal saving decision if the log utility is assumed. It
is because the increase in product variety only increases the level of utility
without raising the marginal utility, under the assumption of log utility.
38
The law of the motion of capital
For a heterogeneous good model, it is possible that the real investment is
not the same as the foregone real consumption as the prices of the invest-
ment goods and the consumption goods can diﬀer. However, I will show
that this is not the case within this model. It is assumed that the capital
stock fully depreciates each period. Therefore, the total (real) capital stock
in the economy at t+ 1, Kt+1 equals to the total (real) investment at t, It:
Kt+1 = It =
ˆ Nt
0
It(i)di
For simplicity, it is assumed the same type of goods are used for both
consumption and investment.27 However, the total capital stock is the
simple sum of each type of investment goods rather than a CES composite.
Due to their consumption smoothing behaviour, agents will divert the same
portion of every type of goods into investment goods28, and the price of
investment goods is identical to the price of consumption goods, p(i) = 1.
Therefore, Sjt =
´ Nt
0
It(i)di = It, and the total real investment, It equals
the nominal saving St.
29 Then, the total real capital stock equals the total
saving in the previous period:
Kt+1 =St
=
β
1 + β
· (W bt · Lb,t +Wwt · Lw,t)
27In this model, investment goods are not inherently diﬀerent from consumption
goods, and there is no separate investment good sector
28Because c(i) is the same for all i, the ratio of investment goods to consumption
goods,
I(i)
c(i)
is the same for all i.
29Therefore, there is no concern about the change in relative price between investment
goods and consumption goods in this model.
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Kt+1 is determined by the product of the saving rate and the sum of all
agents' labour income in the previous period. In the RHS of the equation,
Nt, W
w
t , W
b
t , L
w
t and L
b
t are all increasing functions of Kt. Therefore, Kt+1
can be expressed as a function of Kt, so that Kt+1 = g(Kt), where g is a
diﬀerence equation which represents the motion of capital. In the steady
state, Kt+1 = Kt. In other words, K
∗ = g(K∗) at steady state, and K∗ is
the steady state level of capital. The steady state level of N , Ww, W b, Lw
and Lb are all determined accordingly as functions of K∗.
Figure 1.13: The motion of capital
The motion of capital is depicted in the Figure 1.13 as a solid curve.
The steady state, K∗, is the point where the curve of the motion of capital
intersects with the 45 degree line.30
1.4.6 Steady state dynamics
Suppose the economy is initially in a steady state at t1 with population
and technology unchanged. If there is a shock in one of the exogenous
30The interval of one generation is assumed to be 30 years, and discount rate is
assumed to be 5% per year.
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parameters of the model, the economy reacts to the shock and then begins
to converge towards the new steady state.
Investment speciﬁc technology shock
The decrease in the parameter value of the minimum required level of
ﬁxed capital, k¯, can be interpreted as a speciﬁc sort of investment speciﬁc
technology shock. For example, the adoption of the FMS (Flexible Manu-
facturing System) was mainly aimed at decreasing the ﬁxed capital cost of
producing new product varieties. Figure 1.14 shows the result of the shock
which decreases k¯. The initial equilibrium is at point A, and the new equi-
librium is at point B. First, the shock on k¯ aﬀects the capital accumulation
process, and it aﬀects the number of product varieties. Then, both the
employment share and the relative wage of white-collar workers respond to
the change in the product variety.
Figure 1.14: steady states with a shock in k¯
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In the top right quadrant, the motion of total capital stock, Kt, is
shown. Before the shock in k¯ occurs, the policy function, which describes
the motion of capital, is the solid curve, Kt+1 = g(Kt). It intersects the 45
degree line at the initial steady state point, A. The decrease in the minimum
required level of ﬁxed capital input per product variety, k¯, enables more
capital to be diverted to variable capital, which increases output. As saving
is a function of output, it increases the saving and the future capital stock,
Kt+1, given the current capital stock, Kt. Therefore, the curve of the
motion of capital shifts upward to Kt+1 =
′
g(Kt), and intersects with the
45 degree line at the new steady state point B. After the shock in k¯, capital
stock jumps to the point A
′
, and then gradually converges toward the new
steady state point B. The steady state capital stock increases from K∗ to
K∗∗.
In the bottom right quadrant, the motion of the number of product
varieties, Nt, is shown. Nt increases with the capital stock but at decreasing
rate, and converges towards the virtual maximum level, Nmax, as the level
of capital stock goes to inﬁnity. At initial steady state, the number of
product varieties is N∗. After the shock, the number of product varieties
jumps given the capital stock, to the point A
′
as the cost of introducing a
new product variety decreases. After the initial jump, the product variety
gradually converges to the point B as the capital stock grows towards the
new steady state level, K∗∗. Therefore, the decrease in k¯ not only increases
N directly but also indirectly increases it through its eﬀect on the capital
stock.
In the bottom left quadrant, the motion of the employment share of
white-collar workers,
Lw
L
, is shown. The employment of white-collar work-
ers, Lw, increases with the number of product varieties, N . At the initial
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steady state, the number of product varieties is N∗, and the correspond-
ing employment share of white-collar workers is l∗. After the shock in k¯,
N increases from N∗ to N∗∗ over time, and the steady state level of the
employment share of white-collar workers increases to l∗∗.
Finally, in the top left quadrant, the motion of the wage premium of
white-collar workers is shown. The wage premium of white-collar workers
over blue-collar workers,
Ww
W b
, is an increasing function of the employment
share of white-collar workers,
Lw
L
. At the initial steady state, the employ-
ment share of white-collar workers is l∗, and the corresponding level of the
wage premium is w∗. After the shock, the steady state level of the employ-
ment share increases to l∗∗, and the steady state level of the wage premium
increases to w∗∗ accordingly.
However, the decrease in k¯ alone cannot increase the employment share
of white-collar workers and the wage premium beyond lmax and wmax, which
correspond to the maximum level of the product variety, Nmax. It does not
mean that the relative demand for white-collar workers can never go beyond
that level at any case, but that other sort of exogenous shocks, such as taste
shock, are required to shift the maximum levels. These maximum levels do
not change with k¯.31
TFP shock
In this model, the production follows a Cobb-Douglas form, Y = A · Lαb ·
K
(1−α)
v . The true TFP is represented by the parameter A, but it diﬀers from
measured TFP due to the existence of ﬁxed input. A TFP shock which
increases the level of A, is supposed to be skill-neutral in a sense that it in-
31Decreased k¯ increases the equilibrium number of product varieties by reducing the
ﬁxed capital cost of introducing new product varieties, but the total ﬁxed capital cost
is assumed to be zero at Nmax.
43
creases the marginal productivity of each factor input proportionately. It is
not supposed to aﬀect relative skill-demand in existing literature. However,
it does aﬀect skill-demand in this model.
Figure 1.15 illustrates the result of a TFP shock which increases A.
The initial equilibrium is at point A, and the new equilibrium is at point
B. The shock on k¯ shifts the capital accumulation curve, but it does not
shift other curves such as the motion of the number of product varieties.
Figure 1.15: steady states with a shock in TFP
In the top right quadrant, the motion of total capital stock, Kt, is
shown. Initially, the steady state level of total capital stock is K∗. After
the shock, the saving, which is an increasing function of output, jumps as
the shock increases output given the capital stock. As saving increases at
every level of capital stock, Kt, the curve of the motion of capital shifts
upward, and the steady state level of capital stock increases to K∗∗.
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The increase in the steady state level of capital stock also increases the
number of product varieties, which is shown in the bottom right quadrant,
as the ﬁxed capital cost declines relative to the wage and the variable cap-
ital cost as capital accumulates. However, the curve of the motion of the
number of product varieties does not shift, and the number of product vari-
eties increases alongside the existing curve. Both the relative employment
and the wage of white-collar workers increase as the number of product
varieties increases, but the curves do not shift.
The maximum level of the number of product varieties, Nmax, does
not increase with the TFP, A. Therefore, the shift in the labour demand
towards white-collar workers is upper-bounded even though the TFP in-
creases towards inﬁnity.
Taste shock
In this model, the price-cost mark-up is determined by the parameter, ρ,
of the CES utility function, which represents the substitutability between
goods. If there is a taste shock, probably due to product innovations, which
makes consumers value diﬀerentiated goods more than before, the mark-up
increases. The eﬀect of the increase in mark-up due to such a taste shock
is shown in the Figure 1.16.
As the mark-up increases, the gross-proﬁt of the ﬁrms increases, and
it induces more ﬁrm entry and increase in product variety. However, the
production quantity per each variety decreases, and variable inputs are
diverted to ﬁxed inputs. Therefore, it reduces output, leading to a de-
creased level of saving and the steady state level of the total capital stock.
The steady state level of capital stock decreases from K∗ to K∗∗, and it
negatively aﬀects the number of product varieties.
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Figure 1.16: steady states with a shock in mark-up
Therefore, there are two contrasting eﬀects of the taste shock, which
increases mark-up, on the steady state level of the product varieties. Given
the level of total capital stock, the equilibrium number of product varieties
increases, which is displayed as an upward shift of the curve of the motion
of the number of product varieties in the bottom left quadrant of the graph.
However, this increase in Nt is partly oﬀset by the decrease in Kt. Both the
relative employment and wage of white-collar workers increase accordingly
in response to the increase in the number of product varieties.
However, a noteworthy point is that the maximum level of the number of
product varieties, Nmax, increases to Nmax
′
in response to the taste shock.
As a response to the increase in Nmax, the corresponding maximum level
of the employment share of white-collar workers, lmax, increases to lmax
′
accordingly, and the maximum level of the wage premium of white-collar
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workers, wmax, increases to wmax
′
Therefore, as the level of mark-up goes
toward inﬁnity, which is very unlikely in the real world, the employment
ratio of white-collar to the blue-collar workers goes towards inﬁnity (in
other words, the employment share of ﬁxed white-collar workers converges
towards 100%).
Labour supply shock
In this model, the labour supply of white-collar workers is endogenously de-
termined, and increases with their wage premium over blue-collar workers.
The decline in the education cost relative to wage, sigmae, increases the
labour supply of white-collar workers given the wage premium. The labour
supply shock is endogenously generated by the shock in the exogenous pa-
rameter, sigmae. The eﬀect of a shock, which decreases the education cost,
sigmae, is shown in the Figure 1.17.
Figure 1.17: steady states with a shock in education cost
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After a positive labour supply shock (due to the fall in education cost),
the wage premium of white-collar workers decreases, appearing as the de-
crease in the slope of the curve in the upper left quadrant. As the relative
wage of white-collar workers decreases, the ﬁxed labour cost of introduc-
ing new product varieties decreases and the number of product varieties
increases. Then, the employment share of white-collar workers increases
with the number of product varieties.
These initial changes are ampliﬁed by the corresponding decrease in
the level of total capital stock. As the number of product varieties jumps
given the level of capital stock, due to the decreased cost of ﬁxed labour
input, more factor inputs are diverted toward ﬁxed inputs. Therefore, both
variable labour and capital inputs decrease, leading to the fall in output.
This reduces saving and decreases the future capital stock, Kt+1, shifting
the motion of capital curve downward in the upper right quadrant. As a
result, the steady state level of capital decreases from K∗ to K∗∗. It partly
oﬀsets the increase in the number of product varieties, and ﬁnally converges
toward the new steady state level, N∗∗. Accordingly, the employment share
of white-collar workers and the wage premium ﬁnally converges toward l∗∗
and w∗∗ each.
1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have presented a dynamic general equilibrium model to
explain the role of overhead labour in skill-biased technological change. In
the model, it is the increasing ratio of the ﬁxed labour input to the variable
labour input that increases the demand for skill. It is because the overhead
labour is assumed to be biased towards non-production workers, and non-
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production workers are usually those with a higher education level.
This model presents several predictions, which diﬀer from the standard
SBTC theory. Firstly, this model predicts that the employment share of
white-collar workers interacts with the market structure. Evidence is pro-
vided suggesting that those industries with higher mark-up are likely to
have higher employment shares of white-collar workers.
Secondly, it is predicted that there is an upper bound to the skill-biased
change. Since the ﬁrms can pay for the ﬁxed labour input only if the
price exceeds the marginal cost, the wage-bill share of white-collar workers
cannot increase indeﬁnitely. Therefore, it is predicted that the growth of
inequality between the white-collar workers and the blue-collar workers is
likely to experience a slowdown in the long run.
Thirdly, while the increase in the employment share of non-production
workers is expected to increase measured labour productivity through the
composition eﬀect in existing literature, this model predicts that the com-
positional eﬀect on the measured productivity will be negative. Therefore,
this model's prediction is consistent with such puzzling empirical facts as
the rapid development of skill-biased technology coupled with stagnant
productivity in the 1980s and the opposite pattern in the 1990s, wherein
the slow down of skill-biased technological change was coupled with the
resurgence of labour productivity growth.
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Appendix. About mark-up ratio data
The mark-up ratio data comes from Oliveira Martins et al. [1996], who
utilized Roeger [1995]'s method. Roeger [1995] utilises the gap between
TFPs measured by diﬀerent methods. Typically, TFP is estimated by
calculating Solow residual as below:
SR = ∆q − α∆l − (1− α)∆k (1.11)
Here, SR refers to Solow residual, and α is the share of labour income
in the output. ∆l, ∆k, ∆q are the diﬀerences in the logs of labour input,
capital input and output. The contribution of each factor in production is
equal to its income share under the assumption of perfect competition.
However, Roeger [1995] showed that TFP can also be estimated using
a price-based Solow residual. It is deﬁned by the diﬀerence between the
increase in the weighted average of the factor price and the increase in the
price of output as below:
SRP = α∆w − (1− α)∆r −∆p (1.12)
Here, SPR refers to price-based Solow residual. ∆w, ∆r, ∆p are the dif-
ference in the logs of wage, rental rate of capital and output price. When
there is a positive technology shock, the output price rises less than the
increase in the factor prices as the factors are consumed less due to the
productivity improvement. In theory, under the assumption of perfect com-
petition, TFPs estimated by both methods should be the same in theory.
However, they are rarely identical in practice.
The point is that the labour's income share of output is not an accurate
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measure of labour's contribution to production under imperfect competi-
tion. The exact contribution of labour is equal to its income share in the
marginal cost, which is lower than the price. Therefore, labour's income
share of output underestimates the contribution of labour and overesti-
mates the contribution of capital under imperfect competition. As a re-
sult, both Solow residuals are biased, but in diﬀerent directions. From the
gap between these two types of Solow residuals, the mark-up ratio can be
estimated as below:
SRt − SRPt = B∆xt + ut (1.13)
∆xt = (∆yt −∆kt) + (∆pt −∆rt)
Here, B is the Learner index deﬁned as B =
P −MC
P
, or B = 1 − 1
µ
,
where µ is mark-up ratio. The mark-up ratio is derived by estimating B in
equation (1.13). However, Oliveira Martins et al. [1996] modify Roeger's
method to incorporate material inputs in equation (1.13). The estimation
equation used in Oliveira Martins et al. [1996] is:
∆yt = B ·∆xt + εt (1.14)
where,
∆yt = (∆q+∆p)−α ·(∆l+∆w)−β ·(∆m+∆pm)−(1−α−β) ·(∆k+∆r)
∆xt = (∆yt −∆kt) + (∆pt −∆rt)
Oliveira Martins et al.(1996) also adjust for the eﬀect of indirect taxes
on the estimated mark-up as below:
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µ =
µe
1 + τ
Here, µe is the estimated mark-up, and τ is indirect tax rate. Estimated
mark-up ratios from Oliveira Martins et al. [1996] are shown in Table 1.1.
The industrial classiﬁcation system they use in Oliveira Martins et al. [1996]
is ISIC rev.2. Data on payment, capital stock and material cost are based
on NAICS 97 classiﬁcation in this study. Therefore, only ISIC rev.2 in-
dustry groups with a clear correspondence to NAICS 97 classiﬁcations are
used for estimation.
Table 1.1: The mark-up ratio in the US manufacturing, 1970-1992
Sector name (ISIC rev.2) Sector (Naics 97) mark-up
Food Products 3112∼ 311000 ∼ 312000 1.05
Beverages 3130∼ - -
Tobacco products 3140∼ 312200 ∼ 313000 1.56
Textiles 3210∼ 313000 ∼ 313000 1.08
Wearing apparel 3220∼ 315000 ∼ 316000 1.10
Leather products 3230∼ 316000∼321000 1.08
Wood products 3310∼ 321000∼322000 1.22
Furniture 3320∼ 337000∼339000 1.06
Paper products & Pulp 3410∼ 322000∼323000 1.13
Printing & Publishing 3420∼ 323000∼324000 1.19
Industrial chemicals 3510∼ 325130∼325400 1.18
Drugs & Medicines 3522∼ 325400∼325500 1.44
Chemical products 3529∼ 325500∼326000 1.26
Petroleum reﬁneries 3530∼ 324110 1.03
Petroleum & Coal products 3540∼ 324121∼324199 1.11
Rubber products 3550∼ - -
Plastic products 3560∼ 326000∼326200 1.07
Pottery & China 3610∼ 327000∼327200 1.09
Glass products 3620∼ 327200∼327300 1.17
Non-metal products 3690∼ 327300∼331000 1.18
Iron & Steel 3710∼ 331000∼331300 1.10
Non-ferrous metals 3720∼ 331300∼332000 1.14
Metal products 3810∼ 332000∼333000 1.09
Oﬃce & Computing mach. 3825∼ 334000∼334200 1.54
Machinery & Equipment 3829∼ 333000∼334000 1.06
Radio, TV & Comm. equip. 3832∼ 334200∼334300 1.40
Electrical apparatus 3839∼ - -
Shipbuilding & Repair 3841∼ - -
Railroad equipment 3842∼ - -
Motor vehicles 3843∼ 336000∼336400 1.09
Motorcycles & Bicycles 3844∼ 336991 1.13
Aircraft 3845∼ - -
Other transport equipment 3849∼ - -
Professional goods 3850∼ - -
Other manufacturing 3900∼ 339000∼340000 1.08
52
Chapter 2
White-collar employment and
ﬁrm scale
2.1 Introduction
There has been a secular rise in the share of white-collar workers, and this is
usually attributed to the aggregate technological change. For example, the
IT revolution, which had widespread eﬀects on the economy, is considered
to be the key factor driving skill-biased technological change. However, the
pattern appears very diﬀerent at ﬁrm level, especially at high frequency. In
this chapter, ﬁrm level high frequency variation in the employment share
of white-collar workers is empirically studied using the ARD ﬁrm level
database on UK manufacturing industries.
A considerable level of heterogeneity between ﬁrms is found. Around
40% of ﬁrms decreased the employment share of white-collar workers from
the previous year, although the aggregate share of white-collar workers
was rising. At ﬁrm level, a large portion of high-frequency changes in
the white-collar employment share cannot be fully explained by aggregate
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technological change, given that it is unrealistic to expect technology to
deteriorate for such a large portion of ﬁrms1, accounting for around 40
percent of total ﬁrms. As Dunne et al. [1996] have pointed out, there are
unobservable factors, seemingly not related to technology, which generate
high-frequency variation in white-collar employment share at ﬁrm level.
This study suggests that the change in ﬁrm scale is one of those factors.
The level of production and employment ﬂuctuates more at ﬁrm level
than at aggregated level. I ﬁnd that the labour demand for white-collar and
blue-collar is not homothetic, so the change in ﬁrm scale aﬀects the com-
position of employment as well as the scale of employment. There has been
literature on the eﬀect of ﬁrm size on a wide range of economic variables
including ﬁrms' survival rate (Baldwin and Raﬁquzzaman, 1995; Disney,
Haskel and Heden, 2003), productivity (Leung, Danny, Meh, Cesaire and
Terajima, Yaz, 2008), earning or job creation(Hijzen, Upward and Wright,
2010), but it is relatively rare to focus on its eﬀect on relative demand for
skilled (white-collar) workers.
In this chapter, the share of white-collar workers is found to be positively
correlated with ﬁrm size across the cross-section. However, it is also found
that the change in the share of white-collar workers is negatively correlated
with the change in ﬁrm scale. So, the main aim of this study is to investigate
why the positive relationship between white-collar employment share and
ﬁrm size in the cross-section dimension is reversed in the time dimension.
As in the ﬁrst chapter, it is also assumed that white-collar workers
constitute ﬁxed labour input. However, two assumptions in the previous
chapter are relaxed here: some of the white-collar workers are variable in-
1This question is somewhat related to another question about RBC theory that how
technology can deteriorate during recession.
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put, and diﬀerent products have diﬀerent levels of ﬁxed white-collar labour
input. As it is assumed that the employment share of variable white-collar
labour to blue-collar workers is homothetic, the non-homothetic property
is supposed to come from the existence of ﬁxed white-collar labour.
The empirical ﬁnding that the adjustment of white-collar employment
is lumpier than the blue-collar workers is consistent with the hypothesis
that white-collar labour is partially a ﬁxed input. The employment of
white-collar workers changes less frequently than that of blue-collar work-
ers. However, when it changes, it changes more. This might be explained by
the partial ﬁxity of white-collar labour input. For example, the ﬁrm's em-
ployment of ﬁxed labour is not supposed to change unless the ﬁrm changes
its product variety to another one with a diﬀerent minimum required level
of ﬁxed labour input. However, once the ﬁrm decides to change the product
into another one with either higher or lower required level of ﬁxed labour
input, the employment of white-collar labour changes discontinuously, gen-
erating lumpy adjustment.
If a ﬁrm produces a more sophisticated product, which requires a higher
level of ﬁxed white-collar labour input, the ﬁrm is more likely to be large
in size. Moreover, higher level of ﬁxed input limits the number of ﬁrms
and increases the price-cost mark-up. Therefore, ﬁrms with higher ﬁxed
labour input also would also show a higher employment share of white-collar
workers. Therefore, the ﬁrm size is positively correlated with white-collar
employment share as both of them are positively correlated with the size
of ﬁxed white-collar labour input, which is unobservable.
However, short-run expansions of output due to positive demand shock
usually do not involve such an upgrading towards more sophisticated prod-
uct. In such a case, only the variable part of labour input increases with
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ﬁrm output scale, and the total employment share of white-collar workers
, including both ﬁxed and variable part, decreases.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 shows
the analytical frame work. Section 2.3 explains the data and implements
empirical estimations. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, a theoretical framework for empirical estimation is pre-
sented. It is also assumed that ﬁrms are producing diﬀerentiated goods,
and ﬁxed cost is required to produce any goods. The ﬁxed cost consists
of white-collar labour. However, each good has diﬀerent minimum require-
ment level of ﬁxed labour input and ﬁrms can select which goods to pro-
duce. For example, developing a new car requires more ﬁxed labour than
developing a new T-shirt.
As the main focus of this chapter is on the empirical analysis of high-
frequency movement of the employment of white-collar workers, it is beyond
the scope to explain what makes a ﬁrm choose a speciﬁc product. It is
assumed for simplicity that ﬁxed input includes only white-collar labour.
2.2.1 Production function
There is a ﬁxed labour input associated with producing product variety i,
L¯i, which is exogenously given. As it is assumed that white-collar work-
ers constitutes ﬁxed labour input, the employment of variable white-collar
workers, LWv,i, is :
LWv,i = L
W
i − L¯i
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The production follows CES function as below:
Yi,t = Ai ·Kαi ·
[
β · (aW · (LW − L¯i))ρ + (1− β) · (aB · LBi )ρ] 1−αρ (2.1)
Yi is the production quantity of ﬁrm i. Ai is skill-neutral technology
level. aW is high-skilled or white-collar labour augmenting technology,
and aB is blue-collar labour augmenting technology. Ki is capital stock.
LBi is low-skilled or blue-collar workers' employment. Among total white-
collar labour input of ﬁrm i, LWi , only variable part, L
W
v,i, enters into the
production function.
However, Yi is not directly observable, and what we can observe directly
from the data is Pi · Yi, the nominal value added output of the ﬁrm. Al-
though the nominal output is converted to real output using existing price
indices, whether it is aggregate price index or industry level price index,
the diﬀerence in the price level across individual ﬁrms cannot be accounted
for fully.
Usually, the real ouput variable of each ﬁrm is constructed from the
observed nominal value added output of each ﬁrm, Pi ·Yi, which is deﬂated
not by individual price , Pi, but by more aggregated price index, P . Then,
what we get as a result is not exactly Yi, but
Pi
P
Yi. Let us denote the
relative price of ﬁrm i compared with the aggregate price level as pi =
Pi
P
.
Then, the production function we actually observe is:
pi · Yi,t = Ai · pi ·Kαi ·
[
β · (aW · LWv,i)ρ + (1− β) · (aB · LBi )ρ] 1−αρ (2.2)
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The above equation (2.2) implies that observed productivity at ﬁrm
level reﬂects not only pure or physical technology but also the relative price
of the good, pi. If a ﬁrm i produces a good which is highly appreciated by
consumers, the relative price of the good, pi, will be higher and contribute
to the growth of observed real output, pi ·Yi. Therefore, the eﬀect of the rise
in pi is hard to distinguish from the eﬀect of the rise in physical technology,
Ai.
This explains why some ﬁrms choose to produce goods with higher
required level of ﬁxed input. Although higher level of ﬁxed labour input
decreases output quantity by lowering the variable input part of white-collar
labour, it may increase the price of the good which the ﬁrm produces. The
reason why the relative price of the good is positively related with the size
of ﬁxed input will be explained later in this chapter.
2.2.2 Fixed white-collar labour
It is assumed ﬁrms need to hire certain number of white-collar workers as
ﬁxed input to produce a new variety of good.2 However, the employment
of white-collar workers is rather quasi-ﬁxed and not completely ﬁxed in
the long-run. Sutton (1991) has proposed that ﬁrms endogenously select
the level of sunk cost such as advertisement cost. In this study, ﬁrms
are supposed to be able to change the level of ﬁxed input by changing to
another variety with diﬀerent level of ﬁxed input.
As it is assumed that the employment of ﬁxed part of white-collar
labour, barLi, is exogenously determined by the characteristic of the vari-
ety, the employment of ﬁxed white-collar labour does not change until the
2Fair (2008) also mentions that the demand for non-production worker is ﬁxed in the
short run.
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ﬁrm changes the product variety into another one.
However, ﬁrms produce more than one product variety in reality, and
even the same product variety sold in diﬀerent regions or countries are
imperfect substitutes for each other. Therefore, the good can be inter-
preted as a composite good, which consists of multiple diﬀerentiated goods
sold in diﬀerent markets. Either adding a new product variety or entering
into a new market with existing product variety can also be interpreted as
changing into another composite good, which requires higher ﬁxed cost.
LWi = L
W
v,i + L
W
f,i
What is observable from data is only the total white-collar labour input
for ﬁrm i, which is the sum of white-collar ﬁxed labour input,LWf,i, and
variable labour input, LWv,i, both of which are not observable from data.
Only the variable part of white-collar labour enters into the CES production
function in the equation (2.2). As the ﬁxed part of white-collar labour input
is considered as sunk-cost, it does not aﬀect the optimization decision based
on the CES production function.
LWv
LB
=
(
aW
aB
) ρ
1−ρ
·
(
wB
wW
· β
1− β
) 1
1−ρ
(2.3)
The relative employment ratio of variable white-collar labour and blue-
collar labour is shown in equation (2.3). It is derived from the optimization
of the CES production function in (2.2). As the CES product function is
homothetic, the relative employment ratio is not directly aﬀected by ﬁrm
scale, either in terms of employment or output.
LH
LB
=
LHv
LB
+
LHf
LB
(2.4)
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The observed employment ratio of white-collar workers and blue-collar
workers,
LH
LB
, is the sum of the employment ratio of variable white-collar to
blue-collar workers and the ratio of ﬁxed white-collar to blue-collar workers.
Therefore, the observed employment share of white-collar workers can rise
even without any increase in the ratio of variable white-collar to blue-collar
labour, if the ratio of ﬁxed white-collar to blue-collar labour increases. This
implies that it is possible for the relative employment ratio of white-collar
workers to change without any change in the production technology as rep-
resented by the CES production function. If the ratio of ﬁxed white-collar
labour to blue-collar labour is aﬀected by ﬁrm scale, then ﬁrm scale can af-
fect the employment share of white-collar workers, although the production
function is homothetic.
2.2.3 ﬁrm size and white-collar share
↗ number of firms ↓⇒ price&markup ↑⇒ L
W
f
LB
↑⇒ L
W
LB
↑
L¯i ↑
↘ firm size ↑
If a group of products in a market require larger ﬁxed input, L¯i, fewer
ﬁrms will be able to enter the market. There will be a smaller number of
ﬁrms, and the degree of competition will be decreased. On the contrary,
if a group of varieties requires smaller ﬁxed input, more ﬁrms will be able
to operate, and this will increase the number of ﬁrms and the competition
between them. We can express the number of ﬁrms in the market j as a
function of the level of ﬁxed input : Nj = N(L¯i).
Unlike the previous chapter, this chapter does not assume constant
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elasticity of substitution as Dixit and Stiglitz [1977], but assumes that
the elasticity of substitution increases as the number of ﬁrms in the market
increase as is suggested in a number of studies (Manez and Waterson [2001],
Krugman [1979a], Lancaster [1980] and Hummels and Lugovskyy [2005]).
For example, Hummels and Lugovskyy [2005] assume that 'all varieties
can be represented by points on the circumference of a circle, with the cir-
cumference being of unit length.' Then, the utility of consumer consuming
a product variety with a property represented by a point ω decreases with
the distance of ω from the consumer's most desired ideal variety with a
property of ω˜, vww˜. As more entrance of ﬁrms crowd the variety space
and make goods more similar each other, it leads to higher elasticities of
substitution and lower mark-up and price. Therefore, both the price and
mark-up is negatively correlated with the number of ﬁrms (products) in
the market. We can express the mark-up as a function of the number of
ﬁrms: markup = µ(N).
As a result, the size of ﬁxed input, L¯i, which is exogenously given to
each product, also determines mark-up through its eﬀect on the number of
ﬁrms : markup = µ(N(L¯i)). Here,
∂µ
∂N
> 0 and
∂N
∂L¯i
< 0.
Therefore, higher mark-up leads to higher share of ﬁxed white-collar
labour as the ratio of the ﬁxed input to the variable input is still positively
correlated with the mark-up although the elasticity of substitution is not
constant unlike in the Dixit-Stiglitz type model.3
However, if a group of varieties requires higher level of ﬁxed input, only
3The existence of ﬁxed cost result increasing return to scale even under constant
marginal cost. Under increasing return to scale, those ﬁrms with higher mark-up reaches
break-even production quantity earlier, and the equilibrium production quantity which
corresponds to zero-proﬁt equilibrium is lower. Therefore, the lower output quantity
leads to lower employment of variable factor, which is biased toward blue-collar workers,
relative to the ﬁxed factor, which is biased toward white-collar workers.
61
large ﬁrms which have ﬁnancial ability to aﬀord large ﬁxed cost expendi-
ture can enter into the market.4 Therefore, there is a positive correlation
between the employment share of ﬁxed white-collar labour, L¯i, and the
ﬁrm size.
As higher level of ﬁxed white-collar labour, L¯i, results in both the in-
crease in the share of white-collar workers and the ﬁrm size, a positive
correlation is predicted between the share of white-collar workers and the
ﬁrm size even though there is no direct causality between them. As the
positive correlation is due to an endogenity caused by the unobservable, L¯i,
following empirical analysis aims to detect the existence of the endogeneity,
rather than eliminating it.
2.2.4 the growth of ﬁrm size and white-collar share
The employment ratio of white-collar workers to blue-collar workers is the
sum of the ratio of the ﬁxed part,
LHf
LB
, and the ratio of the variable part,
LHv
LB
, as in the equation (2.4). The employment of ﬁxed white-collar labour
input is determined by the size of ﬁxed labour input, L¯i, which does not
change with the output unless the ﬁrm changes its product variety. The
increase in production quantity due to demand shock is not supposed to in-
crease the demand for ﬁxed white-collar labour input. Only the increase in
output caused by the exogenous increase in the ﬁxed labour input, barLi,
is positively correlated with the growth of ﬁxed part of white-collar em-
ployment, LHf .
Any increase in ﬁrm size which is not caused by the increase in the size of
ﬁxed input, L¯i, does not increase the demand for ﬁxed white-collar labour,
4Cabral and Mata [2003] have argued that the limit to ﬁnancial access is the main
obstacles of the ﬁrm growth, and many ﬁrms, especially young ﬁrms, have less than
desirable size due to ﬁnancial constraint.
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LWf , but only increases the demand for variable labour inputs. Therefore,
the ratio of ﬁxed white-collar labour to blue-collar labour,
LHf
LB
, declines
as a result. However, the ratio of the variable part of white-collar to blue-
collar labour,
LHv
LB
, remains unchanged as the CES production function
is homothetic. Therefore, the ratio of white-collar labour to blue-collar
labour,
LW
LB
, declines with the growth of ﬁrm size.
In sum, the growth in ﬁrm size is positively correlated with white-collar
employment share if it is driven by an exogenous increase in the ﬁxed labour
input, LWf , and negatively correlated if it is driven by other factors such
as positive demand shock. However, for a high-frequency output variation,
the case of output variation due to a change in product variety is likely to
be rarer as it takes time for ﬁrms to change product variety.
2.3 Empirical Results
2.3.1 Data
The Annual Respondent Database (ARD) by ONS (Oﬃce for National
Statistics, UK) will be used for empirical analysis in this chapter. The
ARD is the micro data, which is based on annual business surveys in the
UK. The dataset includes data on total sales, value added, industrial clas-
siﬁcation (SIC) and employment. The sources of the dataset were ACOP
(Annual Census of Production) and ACOC (Annual Census of Production
and Construction) until 1997, but changed to the ABI (Annual Business
Inquiry) from 1998 onwards as the former business surveys were merged
into the ABI in 1998.
A merit of the ARD dataset is that it provides wide coverage with very
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disaggregated level data. The business surveys underlying the ARD are
sampled from the ONS business register. Until 1993, the CSO business
register, which was based on VAT register and other sources, was used and
covered manufacturing and other production industries (e.g. construction).
However, the IDBR register replaced the CSO register after 1994, and the
coverage expanded to the majority of the all the businesses in Great Britain
(the total turn over of ﬁrms in the register accounts for the 98% of the whole
country).
The unit of reporting in the ARD dataset is at three diﬀerent level
of aggregation. First, the "Local unit" is the most disaggregate level of
reporting unit (e.g. a workshop, factory or warehouse, etc) and is deﬁned
based on its location. Second, "Establishment" is the most disaggregated
unit, which responds to the business survey. Most local units are too small
to fully respond to the survey, and the parent unit of several local units,
which is called "Establishment" reports full information on behalf of every
local unit. "Enterprise group" includes all the establishments and local
units under common control. The unit of analysis of this study will be the
establishment.5 However, the problem is that the change in the register in
1994 caused discontinuity in the identiﬁer of the establishments, and the
mapping by ONS is not perfect. This can be an serious issue when the
annual changes in several variables (e.g. employment and value-added) are
calculated because the values of the diﬀerence can be greatly mis-measured
if the observations with the same establishment identiﬁer actually indicate
diﬀerent establishments.6
However, not all establishments are sampled to report full survey forms.
5The deﬁnition of "establishment" does not exactly match with that of a ﬁrm, but
an establishment will be considered as a ﬁrm in this chapter, for simplicity.
6This issue becomes more serious if annual changes, rather than levels, are analysed.
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According to Griﬃth [1999], every establishment with the employment size
of over one hundred reports in the survey, while smaller ones with the em-
ployment less than one hundred are randomly selected every year (at the
probability between 1/5 to 1/2). The data on those sampled establish-
ments are in the selected ﬁle with full information, while the data on other
non-sampled establishments and non-reporting local units (although they
belong to the sampled establishments) are in the non-selected ﬁle with lim-
ited information, such as establishment identiﬁer, industry classiﬁcation,
and imputed employment.
Another very important advantage of this dataset is that the data on
employment oﬀer a helpful categorization, namely that of the employees as
administrative, technical and clerical workers (ATC) and operative work-
ers (OP). The administrative workers are roughly equivalent to white-collar
workers or non-production workers, who are supposed to have a higher edu-
cational level. The operative workers are roughly equivalent to blue-collar
workers or production workers. However, distinction in the employment
categories is maintained only until 1995. Since 1995, the dataset does not
distinguish between the two types of workers.
Therefore, the empirical analysis will be limited to the observations
in the period of between 1978 and 1993, in the selected ﬁle and within
manufacturing industries, as they include all the variables needed and are
not aﬀected by the change in the register in 1994.
2.3.2 Overview
The employment trends of both administrative and operative workers in
the dataset are shown in Figure(2.1). The share of administrative work-
ers in 1979 (amongst the sampled UK manufacturing ﬁrms) was 29.7%.
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Figure 2.1: Employments by type of workers in UK manufacturing indus-
tries
Source: Annual Respondent Database, 1979-1993
It began to rise gradually and reached the level of 35.0% in 1993. How-
ever, the absolute number of administrative workers did not rise for the
same period but decreased gradually. The total employment of the admin-
istrative workers decreased by 24.9% from 1,368,887 in 1979 to 1,027,418
in 1993. It is the further decline in the employment of operative workers
which increased the share of administrative workers in the manufacturing
sector. The operatives' employment dropped by 41.1% from 3,244,708 to
1,911,580 for the same period.
However, such a trend is not homogeneous for every ﬁrm. Firms show
heterogeneous patterns in terms of the annual change in the share of ad-
ministrative workers. Table 2 shows that 44.6% of ﬁrms decreased the share
of administrative workers from the previous year, while 51.8% of ﬁrms in-
creased the share and 3.6% of ﬁrms did not change the share from the
previous year.
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Table 2.1: Employment growth by type of workers
year Share of admin total administrative operative
1979 29.7% 4,613,595 1,368,887 3,244,708
1980 30.8% 4,280,101 1,320,054 2,960,047
1981 31.9% 3,835,123 1,221,934 2,613,189
1982 32.5% 3,537,837 1,148,747 2,389,090
1983 32.9% 3,313,091 1,088,522 2,224,569
1984 32.7% 3,382,610 1,104,948 2,277,662
1985 33.3% 3,138,484 1,044,024 2,094,460
1986 33.2% 3,028,121 1,004,833 2,023,288
1987 33.9% 3,036,721 1,029,228 2,007,493
1988 33.8% 3,046,362 1,030,752 2,015,610
1989 33.4% 3,258,172 1,089,298 2,168,874
1990 34.1% 3,005,449 1,025,229 1,980,220
1991 34.5% 2,828,766 974,746 1,854,020
1992 34.9% 3,103,535 1,084,632 2,018,903
1993 35.0% 2,938,998 1,027,418 1,911,580
Note: The sum of all sampled manufacturing ﬁrms in the ARD data.
Figure 2.2: The annual changes in the share of administrative workers
Note: All sampled manufacturing ﬁrms in 1979-1993
2.3.3 Lumpy adjustment for non-production workers
There has been empirical research on ﬁrms' employment adjustment. For
example, Davis and Haltiwanger [1992] have reported that 29% of job cre-
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Table 2.2: The annual changes in the share of administrative workers
∆(L
w
L
) share obs.
> 0 51.8% 44,069
= 0 3.6% 3,049
< 0 44.6% 37,954
ation and 23% of job destruction are due to modest employment growth of
individual ﬁrms.
All ﬁrms in the sample are grouped into three categories, namely ﬁrms
with no employment change, ﬁrms with moderated change, ﬁrms with large
change, and the ﬁrms which did not change employment level at all from
the previous year.7
The growth rate of employment is determined as below followingDavis
and Haltiwanger [1992]:
gi,t =
Li,t − Li,t−1
1
2
∗ (Li,t + Li,t−1)
gi,t is the employment growth rate of type i at year t. The type is
either white-collar workers, blue-collar workers or total number of workers
including both white-collar workers and blue-collar workers. Li,t is the
employment of type i at year t. If |g| ≤ 0.2, the employment change is
counted as moderated change. If |g| > 0.2, it is counted as large change.
In Table 2.3, the share of ﬁrms according to the employment growth
rate is shown. The administrative workers are roughly equivalent to non-
production workers or white-collar workers or skilled workers. The op-
erative workers are roughly equivalent to production workers, blue-collar
workers or unskilled workers.
7Diﬀerent years of the same ﬁrm are counted as diﬀerent observations.
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The share of ﬁrms without any employment change in total employ-
ment is 5.8%. It is 17.2% for administrative workers, which is signiﬁcantly
higher than the 7.2% for operative workers. This result is consistent with
the ﬁndings of Hamermesh [1993] and Pfann and Palm [1993] that the ad-
justment of non-production workers is more rigid than that of production
workers.
However, the share of ﬁrms with large employment change, either pos-
itive or negative, is higher for administrative workers than the operative
workers. The share of ﬁrms with large total employment growth rate,|g|,
exceeding 0.2, either positive or negative, is 15.6%. It is 24.7% for admin-
istrative workers, which is higher than 21.3% of operative workers. The
share of ﬁrms with moderate employment change rate, |g| ≤ 0.2, is 78.5%
for total workers. It is 58.1% for Administrative workers, which is lower
than 71.5% for operative workers.
Table 2.3: Employment growth by type of workers
Employment growth Administrative Operative Total
|g| > 0.2 24.7% 21.3% 15.6%
|g| < 0.2 58.1% 71.5% 78.5%
|g| = 0 17.2% 7.2% 5.8%
Note: Annual growth of ﬁrms in 1979-1993
Table 2.4: Employment growth by type of workers - positive change
Employment growth Administrative Operative Total
|g| > 0.2 29.6% 20.4% 14.3%
|g| < 0.2 70.4% 79.6% 85.7%
In terms of employment growth, if a distinction is made between the
positive and negative growth, then the share of large change for the negative
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Table 2.5: Employment growth by type of workers - negative change
Employment growth Administrative Operative Total
|g| > 0.2 30.1% 24.7% 18.3%
|g| < 0.2 69.9% 75.3% 81.7%
change is higher than for the positive change for every type of worker as
shown in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5.
This implies higher adjustment cost for ﬁring than hiring. However,
the share of large change is higher for white-collar workers for both posi-
tive change and negative change although the share of no change is higher
for white-collar workers as well. For every case, the share of moderate em-
ployment change of total workers is shown to be higher than that for both
administrative workers and operative workers.
My model suggests that the ﬁrm's employment of ﬁxed part of white-
collar workers does not change until the ﬁrm changes its product variety.
This explains the high share of ﬁrms that do not change the employment
of white-collar workers. However, once ﬁrms change the product variety
or add another product variety, then they need to change the employment
of white-collar workers discontinuously. That creates lumpy adjustment of
white-collar labour.
2.3.4 The eﬀect of ﬁrm size
The share of non-production workers is initially very high remaining stable
at 44.7% for ﬁrms with total employment between 1 and 9 but then begin-
ning to fall until the total employment of the ﬁrms reaches 30-39. The share
of non-production workers is the lowest, 27.5%, for ﬁrms with the total em-
ployment between 30 and 39. Then, the share of non-production workers
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Figure 2.3: Employment share of administrative workers by ﬁrm size
Note: The average employment share between 1979 and 1993
increases with the ﬁrm size continuously. When the employment size is
higher than 500 employees, the average share of non-production workers is
34.6%.
It is interesting that the share of white-collar workers is seen to decrease
in scale among small ﬁrms. One possible reason is that there might be a
lower bound of white-collar employment. For example, ﬁrms need to hire
at least one white-collar worker - manager of the ﬁrm - although it is very
small. Then, the share of white-collar workers would increase as ﬁrm size
decreases.
Several questions arose. The ﬁrst question was whether the relative
employment share of white-collar workers in the total employment was
aﬀected by ﬁrm size, either in terms of employment or value added output.
The second question was whether the relative employment of white-collar
workers was increasing to scale or decreasing to scale and, lastly, whether
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there was any endogeneity behind such relationship between ﬁrm scale and
white-collar employment share. To address these, OLS, Fixed-Eﬀect and
Between-eﬀect regressions were implemented and compared to each other.
ln
(
LHi,t
LBi,t
)
= α + β · ln (Yi,t) + trend+ εi,t (2.5)
The dependent variable, ln
(
LHi,t
LBi,t
)
is the log of the ratio of white-collar
workers to blue-collar workers in ﬁrm i at time t. It is regressed for both
the log of value added output, ln (Yi,t). A linear time trend dummy is also
included.
The ﬁrm size can be deﬁned in terms of both output and employment.
Therefore, it is regressed for ln(L), the log of total employment as well.
ln
(
LHi,t
LBi,t
)
= α + β · ln (Li,t) + trend+ εi,t (2.6)
Table 2.6: The eﬀect of ﬁrm size - OLS
ln(L
W
LB
) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Y ) 0.163***(0.005) 0.162***(0.005) - -
ln(L) - - 0.098***(0.007) 0.098***(0.007)
trend - 0.004***(0.001) - 0.008***(0.001)
Obs. 112,800 112,800 112,800 112,800
Note:
1) LW : the employment of white-collar (Administrative) workers in the ﬁrm
2) LB : the employment of blue-collar (Operative) workers in the ﬁrm
3) ***: signiﬁcant at 1% error level
4) standard errors in the parenthesis are clustered at ﬁrm level
The OLS results are shown in Table 2.6. Both output and total em-
ployment are very highly signiﬁcant (at 1% signiﬁcance level) and positively
correlated with the share of non-production workers. One percent increase
in the ﬁrm output is associated with the increase of the relative employ-
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ment ratio of white-collar workers to blue-collar workers by approximately
0.163 percent. However, there must be a caution to interpreting this result
for it does not necessarily indicate that the white-collar employment share
increases by 0.163 percent when a ﬁrm increases its output, as will be shown
later. The scale eﬀect also appears with respect to the employment size as
well. One percent increase in the total employment of the ﬁrm is associ-
ated with the increase of the ratio of white-collar workers by 0.098 percent.
The result remains qualitatively the same after including the time trend
dummy. The coeﬃcients on the trend dummy are positively signiﬁcant for
both regressions : 0.004 for output and 0.008 for employment. It implies
that there exists an upward trend in white-collar employment share.
Panel analysis
OLS estimation result includes both direct eﬀect of ﬁrm size on white-collar
employment share and the indirect eﬀect due to endogeneity. The ﬁrm
size is positively correlated with the unobserved requirement level of ﬁxed
white-collar workers, LWf , which is also positively correlated with the white-
collar employment share (including both variable part and ﬁxed part of
white-collar employment). As signiﬁcant part of the positive correlation in
OLS might come from such endogeneity, panel analysis is also implemented.
Because the size of ﬁxed white-collar employment requirement is speciﬁc to
the characteristic of the product which the ﬁrm is producing, it is unlikely
to change in short-term although it is not entirely ﬁxed. Therefore, a
signiﬁcant part of the eﬀect from the size of ﬁxed white-collar labour, LWf ,
is supposed to be captured by the time-invariant ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect.
Fixed-eﬀect estimation shows completely diﬀerent results. The result
is shown in Table 2.7. The coeﬃcient of the ﬁrm size, both in terms of
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Table 2.7: The eﬀect of ﬁrm size - FE
ln(L
W
LB
) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Y ) -0.045***(0.006) -0.053***(0.006) - -
ln(L) - - -0.183***(0.014) -0.174***(0.015)
trend - 0.010***(0.001) - 0.008***(0.001)
Obs. 112,800 112,800 112,800 112,800
output and employment, turns to negative. The coeﬃcient of the log of
value added output is -0.045 and that of the log of employment is -0.183.
The values remain qualitatively unchanged after time trend dummy is in-
cluded. The coeﬃcients on time trend are positive for ﬁxed-eﬀect case as
well. These contrasting patterns imply that a large part of the positive
correlation between ﬁrm scale and relative demand for white-collar labour
comes from between-ﬁrm eﬀect. Therefore, between-eﬀect panel estimation
is also implemented.
Table 2.8: The eﬀect of ﬁrm size - BE
ln(L
W
LB
) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Y ) 0.173***(0.004) 0.172***(0.004) - -
ln(L) - - 0.098***(0.005) 0.097***(0.005)
trend - 0.004***(0.002) - 0.010***(0.002)
Obs. 112,800 112,800 112,800 112,800
The between-eﬀect estimation result is shown in Table 2.8. The coeﬃ-
cient of log output is 0.173, which is slightly larger than the OLS estimate.
The coeﬃcient of log employment is 0.098 and also signiﬁcant at 1% signif-
icance level. The coeﬃcients of time trend for log output equation is 0.004
and that of log employment is 0.010. Both are signiﬁcant at 1% signiﬁcance
level.
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2.3.5 The change in administrative workers' employ-
ment share
Table 2.9: The eﬀect of the change in the ﬁrm output
∆ln(L
W
LB
) (1) (2) (3)
∆ln(Y ) -0.040***(0.004) -0.036***(0.004) -0.022***(0.007)
∆ln(Y ) ∗Dneg - - -0.025***(0.010)
year dummies No Yes Yes
Obs. 84,046 84,046 84,046
Note: Dneg = 1 if ∆ln(Y ) < 0
∆ln
(
LHi,t
LBi,t
)
= α+β1 ·∆ln (Yi,t) +Dyear +β2 ·DnegY ·∆ln (Yi,t) + εi,t (2.7)
DnegY = 1 if ∆ln (Yi,t) < 0
∆ln
(
LHi,t
LBi,t
)
is the annual change in the log of the ratio of white-collar
workers to blue-collar workers in ﬁrm i between time t and t−1. ∆ln (Yi,t)
is the annual change in the log of output. Dyear is set of dummies for
each year. Each year dummy corresponds to any common disturbance
speciﬁc to that year, aﬀecting the white-collar employment share across
all ﬁrms. Aggregate skill-biased technology shock, which is speciﬁc to the
year, is supposed to be captured by the year dummy. However, the positive
and negative changes in output might have heterogeneous eﬀect on the
white-collar employment share. Therefore, the interaction dummy term is
included. DnegY = 1 if the change in output is negative.
∆ln
(
LHi,t
LBi,t
)
= α+β1 ·∆ln (Li,t) +Dyear +β2 ·DnegL ·∆ln (Li,t) +εi,t (2.8)
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DnegL = 1 if ∆ln (Li,t) < 0
The regression results on the annual diﬀerences are shown in Table 2.9
and Table 2.10. The diﬀerence in the log employment share of white-collar
workers is negatively correlated with the diﬀerence in the log of output. One
percent increase in value added output from the previous year decreases the
relative employment ratio of white-collar workers by 0.040 percent. The
inclusion of year dummies decreases the absolute size of coeﬃcient slightly
from -0.040 to -0.036.
However, if the interaction dummy, which becomes 1 if the change in
value added is negative, is included, the coeﬃcient changes from -0.036 to
-0.022. The coeﬃcient on the interaction dummy term is negative, which
is -0.025, and this means that the negative correlation between the change
in ﬁrm size (in terms of value added output) and the employment share of
administrative workers is stronger for negative change than positive change.
Table 2.10: The eﬀect of the change in the ﬁrm employment
∆ln(L
W
LB
) (1) (2) (3)
∆ln(L) -0.249***(0.017) -0.245***(0.017) -0.284***(0.033)
∆ln(L) ∗Dneg - - 0.069*(0.040)
year dummies No Yes Yes
Obs. 84,046 84,046 84,046
Note: Dneg = 1 if ∆ln(Y ) < 0
The negative correlation is even larger for employment change. One
percent increase in the employment from the previous year decreases the
relative employment ratio of white-collar workers by 0.249 percent. The
inclusion of year dummies just slightly decrease the magnitude of the co-
eﬃcient from -0.249 to -0.245. The coeﬃcient of the interaction dummy
for negative change is positive, which is 0.069. This is in contrast with the
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result for the change in output. This implies that the negative relationship
between the change in ﬁrm size and the employment share of white-collar
workers is weaker for negative ﬁrm size change if the ﬁrm size is measured
in terms of employment.
This result is also in line with Dunne et al. [1996], who report that
white-collar employment share is negatively correlated with the business-
cycle in the US manufacturing industries.
2.3.6 Potential alternative explanations
It is also possible to explain the above result, namely the negative correla-
tion between the change in the employment share of white-collar workers
and the change in ﬁrm size, under the conventional assumption that both
types of workers are variable factors. For example, it is usually presumed,
including by Dunne et al. [1996] and Hamermesh [1993], that adjustment
costs (hiring and ﬁring costs) of skilled workers are greater than those for
unskilled workers. If so, ﬁrms which increase employment to meet the de-
mand during expansion hire blue-collar workers ﬁrst and ﬁre blue-collar
workers ﬁrst when they have to decrease production. This also generates
the negative correlation between the change in ﬁrm output (or employ-
ment) and the change in the employment share of white-collar workers
(skilled workers).
The underlying assumption of such an explanation is that the optimal
employment of white-collar workers changes ﬂexibly in response to output
ﬂuctuations, but the actual employment does not follow up the optimal em-
ployment due to the labour rigidity. Therefore, such a rigid adjustment of
white-collar employment would disappear if the rigidities (in terms of hiring
and ﬁring costs) are removed. In contrast, what this study suggests is that
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the optimal employment (for white-collar labour) itself is rigid. Therefore,
one implication of this study is that the adjustment of the employment of
white-collar workers will still remain less responsive to the output ﬂuctua-
tions, although the hiring and ﬁring costs approach zero.
The implications on productivity are also diﬀerent between the two ex-
planations. If white-collar labour is regarded as entirely variable input, the
employment ratio of white-collar to blue-collar workers would deviate from
the optimal level both during the boom time and recession time, leading to
lower productivity, certeris paribus. To explain the pro-cyclical productiv-
ity, an exogenous technology shock, which is large enough to oﬀset such a
negative compositional eﬀect, is required. However, under the assumption
of this thesis that white-collar labour is an overhead input, such a compo-
sitional eﬀect of labour force is likely to contribute to the pro-cyclicality of
labour productivity. Therefore, implied size of positive technology shock
to match the observed pro-cyclicality of productivity would be signiﬁcantly
smaller under the framework of this study.
To test which of the contrasting predictions are true requires identiﬁca-
tion of whether the expansion of each ﬁrm is due to a demand shock or a
supply shock (productivity shock). However, it is beyond the scope of this
study and remains to be further studied.
2.4 Conclusion
The share of administrative workers is found to be positively correlated
with ﬁrm scale in UK manufacturing industries. However, this positive
correlation is due to the between-ﬁrms eﬀect, and a negative correlation is
found in time dimension. This implies that ﬁrm size is positively correlated
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with only the ﬁrm-speciﬁc, time-invariant eﬀect.
This study suggests that this is due to the positive correlation between
the minimum required level of white-collar workers to produce the product,
which the ﬁrm is producing and the size of the ﬁrm. High frequency varia-
tions in output changes aﬀect only the demand for variable inputs and do
not aﬀect ﬁxed labour input, which is biased towards ﬁxed input, leading
to the negative correlation between ﬁrm size and the employment share of
white-collar workers over time.
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Chapter 3
The eﬀect of ﬁrm entry and exit
on skill demand and productivity
3.1 Intro
Firm entry and exit have signiﬁcant inﬂuences over job creation and job
destruction, and this is also considered to be an important source of produc-
tivity growth. (Wheeler [2005]; Dunne et al. [1996]); Aghion et al. [2004];
Foster et al. [1998]) Then, the next question, which arises, is whether ﬁrm
entry and ﬁrm exit are also related with the shift in skill demand. In this
chapter, the eﬀects of ﬁrm entry and exit on the employment of white-collar
workers and the labour productivity are empirically tested using ﬁrm level
data on UK manufacturing industries.
It is found that entering ﬁrms have signiﬁcantly higher labour produc-
tivity, but this is due to the fact that ﬁrm entry is more concentrated in
the industries with higher labour productivity. However, exiting ﬁrms have
lower labour productivity. This is consistent with the theory that negative
productivity shock leads ﬁrms to exit (Hopenhayn [1992]).
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It is found that entering ﬁrms have a signiﬁcantly higher share of ad-
ministrative workers than incumbent ﬁrms. It is not surprising given that
new ﬁrms are supposed to embody the latest technology. However, it is
found that not only entering ﬁrms but also exiting ﬁrms have higher share
of administrative workers than incumbent ﬁrms. It is rather surprising
considering the fact that exiting ﬁrms are declining ﬁrms with lower labour
productivity. It means that this pattern cannot be explained simply as a
result of technological progress.
It might be due to that exiting ﬁrms lay oﬀ operative workers before they
lay oﬀ administrative workers, who are supposed to constitute ﬁxed labour
input. The negative correlation between the change in ﬁrm scale and the
change in the share of administrative workers found in the previous chapter
is consistent with the ﬁnding that both entering and exiting ﬁrms have
higher share of administrative workers. Upon entry, the ﬁrms experience
positive change in ﬁrm scale, while ﬁrms experience negative change in ﬁrm
scale before exit.
However, the main assumption of this study that skilled workers mainly
constitute overhead labour implies that at least part of the decline in the
labour productivity of exiting ﬁrms comes from the scale eﬀect. The de-
crease in the share of variable factors decreases labour productivity even
further, amplifying the exogenous productivity shock.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 shows
the outline of the data. Section 3.3 implements empirical estimations.
Section 3.4 concludes.
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3.2 Data
The same ARD database is used as in the previous chapter. An entrant is
deﬁned as the ﬁrm which did not exist at t-1 but appears at t. An exitor is
deﬁned as the ﬁrm which exists at t but does not exist at t+1. Stayers are
those ﬁrms which have existed over t-1, t and t+1. Those ﬁrms entering
at t and directly exiting at t+1 are excluded.
To determine which ﬁrms are entering, exiting or staying ﬁrms, the non-
selected ﬁles are used as well as the selected ﬁles following Disney et al.
[2003]. Not all ﬁrms are sampled every year; larger ﬁrms report every year,
but smaller ﬁrms are sampled randomly.1 Therefore, as only selected ﬁrms
reported data on the employment of administrative workers and operative
workers, looking at only selected ﬁles can cause bias as unsampled ﬁrms
might be counted as exit ﬁrms although they actually did not exit but
were just not sampled. Therefore, both selected and non-selected ﬁles are
combined. If a ﬁrm which appeared on the selected ﬁles at time t did not
appear at t+1 on the same ﬁle but still appears on the non-selected ﬁles,
it is not counted as ﬁrm exit. Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics on
the ﬁrm entry and exit in UK manufacturing industries between the years
1979 to 1995.
The average number of total employees per ﬁrm, emptot is 156.23 for
entering ﬁrms, 266.67 for exiting ﬁrms and 280.58 for incumbent ﬁrms. The
entrant ﬁrms are the smallest in employment size, and the incumbent ﬁrms
are the largest. However, the entering ﬁrms have the largest employment
share of administrative workers,
empadmin
emptot
, 32.52%, while the incumbent
1According to Oulton [1997], from 1986 to 1988, ﬁrms employing more than 100
workers reported every year, but only half of ﬁrms with an employment size of between
50 and 100 were sampled/
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Table 3.1: Firm entry and exit
Entrant Exitor Stayer
emptot 156.23 266.67 280.58
empadmin 54.77 89.81 92.57
empop 101.46 176.86 188.00
empadmin
emptot
32.52% 31.30% 30.01%
Obs. 6,421 6,583 191,485
ﬁrms have the smallest share, 30.01%. Nevertheless, the exiting ﬁrms also
show higher share of administrative workers, 31.30%, than the incumbent
ﬁrms.
3.3 The eﬀects of ﬁrm entry and exit
To capture the eﬀect of ﬁrm entry and exit on the skill demand, a regression
is implemented including dummy variables representing ﬁrm entry and exit:
swi,t = α+β1 ·Dentry,i,t+β2 ·Dexit,i,t+γ1 ·ln(emptot,i,t)+γ2 ·ln(emptot,i,t)2+εi,t
(3.1)
swi,t =
empadmin
emptot
∗ 100
swi,t is the employment share of administrative workers of ﬁrm i, at year
t. The eﬀects of ﬁrm entry and exit are captured by the coeﬃcients of the
dummy variables, Dentry,i,t and Dexit,i,t.
As shown in Chapter 2, the employment share of non-production work-
ers is positively correlated with ﬁrm size across the cross-section. As both
entering ﬁrms and exiting ﬁrms are smaller than incumbent ﬁrms, the co-
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eﬃcients on the dummies of entrance and exit might be downward biased.
Therefore, the log of the employment size, ln(emptot,i,t), is included in the
regression equation (3.1). To capture the non-linearity of the eﬀect of ﬁrm
size, the square of the variable, ln(emptot,i,t)
2, is also included.
Table 3.2: The eﬀects on the share of administrative workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent: sw s˜w
DEntrant 2.632*** 2.901*** 1.328*** 1.554***
(0.317) (0.313) (0.257) (0.256)
DExitor 1.289*** 1.292*** 1.163*** 1.178***
(0.266) (0.265) (0.213) (0.212)
ln(emptot) - -4.151*** - 1.245***
(0.552) (0.101)
ln(emptot)
2 - 0.537*** - 0.389***
(0.0572) (0.0486)
Constant 30.02*** 36.87*** -0.0918 0.0380
(0.119) (1.279) (0.0836) (0.106)
Observations 203,970 203,970 203,970 203,970
R-squared 0.001 0.010 0.000 0.006
Note:
1) standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered at ﬁrm level
2) over the period of 1979-1995 in UK manufacturing industries
The regression result is shown in Table 3.2. The dependent variable is
the employment share of administrative workers, swi,t, in 0-100% scale for
the ﬁrst two columns. In the ﬁrst column, the coeﬃcient for the dummy
variable for entrant ﬁrm is 2.632 and signiﬁcant at 1% error level before
controlling the eﬀect of ﬁrm size. It means that the entering ﬁrms in UK
manufacturing showed 2.632 %p higher employment share of administrative
workers than the incumbent ﬁrms. However, what is rather surprising is
that the exiting ﬁrms also showed signiﬁcantly higher employment share
of administrative workers. The coeﬃcient for the dummy variable of ﬁrm
exit is 1.289 and signiﬁcant at 1% error level.
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In the second column, the regression result which includes variables
representing ﬁrm size is shown. The coeﬃcients for ﬁrm entry and exit
increases slightly after controlling the eﬀect of ﬁrm size and remains sig-
niﬁcant at 1% error level. This implies ﬁrm size is positively related with
the employment share of administrative workers. However, the coeﬃcients
for the dummies of ﬁrm entry and exit not only remain signiﬁcant but also
increase in the size. This might reﬂect the fact that both the entering ﬁrms
and exiting ﬁrms are smaller than incumbent ﬁrms.
However, it is possible that the year-speciﬁc and industry-speciﬁc fac-
tors have caused a bias in the estimate. For example, ﬁrm entry or exit
might have been more frequent in some industries than others, while those
industries are diﬀerent with respect to the employment share of adminis-
trative workers. Therefore, it will be examined whether the employment
share of administrative workers in the entering or exiting ﬁrms is higher
than the average of the same industry in the same year.
s˜wi,t = α+β1 ·Dentry,i,t+β2 ·Dexit,i,t+γ1 ·ln( ˜emptot,i,t)+γ2 ·ln( ˜emptot,i,t)2+εi,t
(3.2)
s˜wi,j,t = s
w
i,j,t − s¯wj,t
˜emptot,i,t = emptot,i,t − ¯emptot,j,t
s¯wj,t is the average employment share of white-collar workers (adminis-
trative workers) of all the ﬁrms in the industry j, categorized by 5-digit
SIC code, at time t. s˜wi,j,t is the diﬀerence between a ﬁrm's own employ-
ment share of white-collar workers and s¯wj,t, the average of the 5-digit SIC
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industry to which the ﬁrm belongs. The variables controlling for ﬁrm size
eﬀect are also replaced by the diﬀerence from the average ﬁrm size of the
industry, ˜emptot,i,t.
The regression result is shown in the 3rd and 4th column of Table
3.2. Although the size of the coeﬃcients decreases slightly, the pattern
remains qualitatively the same. Both the entering and exiting ﬁrms show
a signiﬁcantly (at 1% error level) higher share of administrative workers
than the average of the ﬁrms in the same industry in the same year.
The eﬀect on the labour productivity
In literature, ﬁrm entrance is considered as an important source of tech-
nological innovation. New ﬁrms are expected to bring new technology to
the economy. However, exiting ﬁrms are supposed to have lower level of
productivity. Therefore, it has been tested whether entering ﬁrms have
higher level of labour productivity.
lnzi,t = α+β1·Dentry,i,t+β2·Dexit,i,t+γ1·ln(emptot,i,t)+γ2·ln(emptot,i,t)2+εi,t
(3.3)
zi,t =
Yi,t
emptot,i,t
The dependent variable of the regression equation (3.3) , lnzi,t, is the log
of the labour productivity of the ﬁrm i at year t. The labour productivity is
deﬁned as the value added output per employee. The nominal value-added
output is converted to the real value added output using GDP deﬂators.
The regression result is shown in Table (3.3). In column (1), the co-
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eﬃcient for the ﬁrm entrance is 0.046 and signiﬁcant at 1% error level.
The coeﬃcient for the ﬁrm exit is -0.097 and signiﬁcant at 1% error level.
This result shows that entering ﬁrms have higher labour productivity than
incumbent ﬁrms, while exiting ﬁrms have lower labour productivity.
Table 3.3: The eﬀects on the labour productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent: ln z ˜ln z
DEntrant 0.0461*** 0.0880*** -0.0319*** 0.0110
(0.00902) (0.00900) (0.00782) (0.00779)
DExitor -0.0966*** -0.0949*** -0.139*** -0.133***
(0.00889) (0.00879) (0.00771) (0.00764)
ln emptot - -0.0776*** - 0.0781***
(0.00752) (0.00148)
(ln emptot)
2 - 0.0160*** - 0.00382***
(0.000735) (0.000721)
Constant 3.334*** 3.317*** -0.153*** -0.112***
(0.00159) (0.0187) (0.00138) (0.00166)
Observations 201,485 201,485 201,485 201,485
R-squared 0.001 0.023 0.002 0.020
Note:
1) standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered at ﬁrm level
2) over the period of 1979-1995 in UK manufacturing industries
However, the fact that both entering and exiting ﬁrms are smaller than
incumbent ﬁrms could bias the estimates downward as the ﬁrm size is
positively correlated with labour productivity. Therefore, variables repre-
senting the log of the number of employees per ﬁrm are included in the
second column. To capture non-linearity, the square term of the log of
employment size is also included. With the inclusion of ﬁrm size dummies,
the coeﬃcients for both entrance and exit increased.
Nevertheless, it is also possible such a relation appeared because ﬁrm
entrance was more frequent in more productive sectors, such as IT indus-
tries. Table 3.4 shows that those industries with higher labour productivity
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also have higher rates of both entry and exit. The correlation between the
log of the labour productivity of the 5 digit SIC industry and the rate
of annual ﬁrm Entry of the industry (percentage point) is 0.126, and the
correlation with the exit rate of the industry is 0.196.
To deal with this issue, the dependent variable of the equation (3.3),
the ﬁrm's own labour productivity, lnzi,t, is replaced with the diﬀerence
between the ﬁrm's own labour productivity and the average labour pro-
ductivity of the 5 digit SIC industry j, ln zi,t − ln z˜j,t. The results are
shown in the column (3) and (4) of the table 3.3. The coeﬃcient for ﬁrm
entrance turns to negative, -0.0319, and signiﬁcant at 1% error level. The
coeﬃcient for ﬁrm exit also decreases to -0.139 and signiﬁcant at 1% error
level. After the ﬁrm size eﬀect is controlled, in the column (4), the coef-
ﬁcient for ﬁrm entry is insigniﬁcant, and the coeﬃcient for ﬁrm exit still
appears negative and still signiﬁcant at 1% error level.
Table 3.4: The correlation between avg. productivity and entry and exit
rates
Entrant (%) Exitor (%) Stayer (%)
ln(labour productivity) 0.126 0.196 -0.201
In summary, ﬁrm exit is negatively correlated with labour productivity
in all speciﬁcations. However, ﬁrm entrance is shown to be positively cor-
related, but the positive correlation is supposed to come from the fact that
ﬁrm entrance is more common in more productive industries. It appears
that entering ﬁrms are not more productive than incumbent ﬁrms in the
same industry in the same year.
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3.3.1 The channel between ﬁrm entry and exit and
skill demand
The ﬁnding that entrant ﬁrms have higher share of administrative workers
does not seem to be strange as new ﬁrms need to hire them to initiate the
new business. It is consistent with the assumption of this study that white-
collar labour is quasi-ﬁxed or overhead labour input rather than variable
input.
However, it is a rather surprising ﬁnding that exiting ﬁrms, with lower
productivity, also show higher share of administrative workers. As the
employment share of more educated workers is supposed to be positively
correlated with the aggregated labour productivity, it is rather puzzling
that ﬁrms exiting the market due to lower productivity actually show a
slightly higher share of administrative workers.
A possible explanation is that declining ﬁrms ﬁre operative workers
earlier than administrative workers, leading to an increase in the share of
administrative workers. If administrative workers constitute variable in-
put, this compositional change is expected to increase labour productivity.
However, if, instead, they constitute quasi-ﬁxed input, it would decrease the
labour productivity by decreasing the share of variable input in the total
factor inputs. The result discussed earlier favours the latter view that ad-
ministrative workers constitute quasi-ﬁxed input, although the factor that
exiting ﬁrms suﬀered a huge negative productivity shock, which oﬀset the
increase in productivity due to compositional eﬀect of labour force cannot
be excluded.
Firm exit is usually explained as result of negative exogenous produc-
tivity shock. However, increasing return to scale due to the existence of
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overhead labour implies that part of the decline in the productivity of exit-
ing ﬁrms is not due to the exogenous productivity shock, but, rather, due to
the ampliﬁcation eﬀect of negative productivity shock via increasing return
to scale.
3.4 Conclusion
It has been empirically examined whether ﬁrm entry and exit have signif-
icant eﬀect on productivity and skill-demand in UK manufacturing indus-
tries. It has been found that entering ﬁrms have higher level of productiv-
ity, but this might be due to the fact that ﬁrm entrance is concentrated in
more productive industries, and no ﬁrm evidence is found that new ﬁrms
are more productive. However, exiting ﬁrms are found to be less productive
as is to be expected.
Entering ﬁrms are found to have a higher share of non-production work-
ers than incumbent ﬁrms even after controlling for other factors, such as
ﬁrm scale, year and industry. However, exiting ﬁrms are also found to have
higher share of administrative workers even after controlling for other fac-
tors, including ﬁrm scale, year and industry, and this fact is noteworthy,
considering that these exiting ﬁrms are also found to have lower labour
productivity. This appears rather puzzling, but, in fact, is consistent with
this study's hypothesis that non-production workers constitute overhead
labour.
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